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White, W* Thomas, M.A., December, 1975
Montana and the Pullman Strike of 1894:
Industrial Warfare (99pp«)
Director:

History
A Western Response to

H. Duane Hampton

The primary goal of this study is a delineation and explanation
of popular reactions in Montana to the Pullman Strike of 1894.
The account views such reactions as a case study of western re
actions to a national labor dispute erupting within a social mil
ieu of former pioneers, industrial workers, and agrarians, living
in a large, sparsely populated and only recently admitted state.
Secondary concerns include federal and state policies and actions
regarding the strike, as well as those of national and local
unions.
Since there is little evidence available in the form of diaries
or personal papers on Montanans* reactions to the strike, the
author has relied on accounts by local, independent, community
newspapers, as well as those by papers which had been purchased by
major mining interests, along the affected railroads. Public docu
ments, military communiques, and the private correspondence of var
ious civilian and military officials, comprised the second major
source of evidence for the actions and attitudes of local, state,
and federal, participants and observers.
Utilizing these sources, the study reveals that the state's
residents were relatively unified in their support of the strikers.
Local economic issues and psychological uncertainties over national
directions resulted in a widespread, popular consensus, which, in
a positive sense, evoked sympathy for the strikers. More negatively,
it represented a communal defense against the onslaught of the
forces of centralization, industrialization, and urbanization,
which were transforming the societal landscape of the United States
in the closing years of the nineteenth century.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION;

THE PULLMAN STRIKE AND

THE CRISIS OP THE 1890s

The decade of the I 89OS was one of intense and bewildering social,
turmoil.

Permeated by what Richard Hofstadter called a "psychic cri

sis,"1 the country was transformed from an agricultural to an industrial
society, and Americans became alarmed by the dimly-perceived and often
misunderstood results which accompanied that transition.

To some, an

industrial and financial "plutocracy" seemed destined to subvert the
traditional institutions and values of the rural community.

To others,

primarily of the middle and upper classes, the spectre of class warfare
reared its head and threatened to disrupt their new-found prosperity
and destroy civilization itself.

The closure of the frontier, announced

by Frederick Jackson Turner in his famous 1893 essay, signified the end
of the frontier "safety valve" for urban discontent, and, for those who
were aware of his pronouncement, it served to heighten their fears amd
apprehensions for the future.
An unprecedented number of labor disturbances erupted in the early
I89OS because of the refusal or inability of the country to adequately

deal with the social readjustments accompanying the meteoric

1Richard Hofstadter. The Age of Reform; From Bryan to F.D.R. (New
York, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), pp. 7-9.
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industrialization of the post-Givil War period.

The depression of I 893

intensified discontent as it unleashed its full fury on an increasingly
urbcLnized and industrialized America,

The economy sank quickly into a

severe depression as 642 banks failed, 2 2 ,5 0 0 miles of railroad mileage
went into receivership, and the industrial market in general collapsed.
As employment and wage reductions increased, both organized and unorga
nized labor suffered during the 1893-94 winter,2

Spring inaugurated the

worst year of the depression in which an estimated 2,5 to 3 million
workers (approximately 20 percent of the work force) were unemployed.
Responding to the economic crisis, workers retaliated through a
series of national and regional protests,

the wage reductions which

accompanied the depression triggered a futile national strike by the
United Mine Workers, representing 180,000 miners, in April and May 1894,
Demanding federal work relief, the Gommonwealers, or Goxeyites, formed
seventeen "industrial armies" and marched on Washington,

Labor protests

became almost commonplace events as over fourteen hundred strikes
occurred in 1894 alone,3
Such unrest clearly alarmed conservatives throughout the country,
iiixtreme tension and a sense of crisis permeated the ranks of the more
affluent, who feared the apparent assault on property rights as well ae
a violent class confrontation.

Within this frightened group, Arnold

Paul suggests, the judiciary assumed increasing importance and, by the
mid-l890s, became the "principal bulwark of conservative defense,"

2Alraont Lindsey, The Pullman Strike; 'Ihe Story of a Unique ii^xperiment and of a Great Labor Upheaval (Ghicago. Illinois î the University
of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 12,
3Ibid., pp. 12 -1 5 ,
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Striking an activist stance, the courts foresook their neutralist ideol
ogies and consummated a conservative-oriented, constitutional revolution
to defend property rights against what they perceived as the "mob,"^
The Pullman Strike, which paralyzed every transcontinental railroad
except the Great Northern, became a focal point for such fears and trig
gered unprecedented judicial and presidential intervention in a laborcapital dispute.

Led by the powerful General Managers* Association

(G.M.A.), the railways had little difficulty persuading the federal
judiciary to aid them against the insurgent American Railway Union
(A.R.Ü.),

The courts quickly issued a series of "omnibus injunctions"

aimed at prohibiting strike activity,

based, among other things, on the

argument that the strike constituted a "restraint of trade" and, thus,
violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the court orders represented a new
departure in American jurisprudence.
Alarmed by exaggerated reports of violence on the affected roads
and ignoring protests by Governor John Peter Altgeld, the Cleveland
Administration dispatched troops to Chicago, the headquarters of strike
activity, to enforce the injunctions and open the roads.

Subsequently,

Cleveland and Attorney-General Richard Olney ordered military interven
tion on railroads throughout the Trans-Mississippi West.

Paced with the

presence of the United States Army, the arrest of its national and local
leaders, and the threat of a hostile federal judiciary, the A.R.U. mem
bership was compelled to admit its defeat.

^Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: Attitudes
of Bar and Bench, 1687-1895 (Ithaca. New York; Cornell University Press,
i 9 6 0 ), pp. 1 - 3 .
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As the fortunes of the American Hallway Union declined in Chicago,
the union's president, Cugene Victor Debs, turned to the West, hoping to
recoup his organization's losses in that distant arena.

Ultimately,

Debs' optimism proved unfounded, since there too, federal injunctions
and armed force guaranteed a railroad victory.
One of the focal points of Debs' hopes was the newly admitted state
of Montana.

Grossed by two transcontinental railroads, the Northern

Pacific and the Great Northern, Montana possessed a relatively large and
active A.R.U. membership.

Moreover, union activity in the state had

provided valuable aid to Debs in his victory over the Great Northern the
previous April.
Debs had more immediate grounds for hope,

Montana's locals had

fervently supported the national convention's decision to boycott
Pullman cars.
confrontation.

If anything, the A.R.U. membership was too eager for a
Angered by a series of wage cuts, locals along the

Northern Pacific line rapidly added the restoration of wages to their
list of grievances— in spite of Debs' desire to limit demands to issues
directly relevant to the Pullman car boycott.

Finally, railroad employ

ees enjoyed a large measure of support from their communities, particu
larly in the western part of the state.
However, though largely unencumbered by an antagonistic press or
hostile public opinion, the strikers in Montana were defeated by the
same forces which precluded success in Chicago.

Federal injunctions,

with the accompanying threat of arrests, coupled with the presence of
federal troops and the introduction of large numbers of imported, non
union workers quickly smashed the Pullman Strike in Montana.
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wake of defeat, union members faced blacklisting or were forced to
renounce the American Bailway Union to regain their jobs at reduced
wages.
The strikers in Montana, like their counterparts throughout the
western United States, were unable to withstand the newly forged alli
ance of corporate and federal power.

In despair, they returned to former

positions or joined the growing ranks of the industrially unemployed.
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CHAPTER IX
'IHlii STRItCK m

CHICAGO

Chicago was the center of the tumultuous Pullman Railroad Strike of
189 ^.

The principal combatants, the powerful General Managers* Associa

tion (G.M.A.) and the potentially powerful American Railway Union
(A.R.U.), maintained their headquarters in the city, which was located
only minutes from the Pullman works, the genesis of the conflict.

Ihe

boycott attained national proportions when those organizations inter
vened in the dispute at Chicago and, later, throughout the TransMississippi West.

When the Cleveland Administration, responding to

requests by the G.M.A., introduced federal power into the conflict, that
force was first used in Chicago in the form of injunctions and troops.
Finally, soon after the G.M.A. achieved victory in Chicago, the rail
roads defeated the national strike as arrests and blacklisting of A.R.U.
leaders followed in the wake of federal troop trains.
Formed in 1886 by the railroads centering or having terminals in
Chicago, the General Managers* Association stated its goal in Article II
of the organization's constitution.
purpose was " . . .

Broadly defined, the Association's

the consideration of problems of management arising

from the operation of railroads terminating or centering in Chicago.

1"Constitution and By-Laws of the General Managers' Association of
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Prior to the Pullman Boycott, the Association was primarily concerned
with issues such as switching, car service, the loading and unloading of
cars, weights of livestock, and rates.

Ihe G.M.A. had only incidentally

considered wages, although the United States Strike Commission, which
was created to investigate the Pullman Strike, suggested that employees
on Association road.s were treated as subjects of that organization.
However, in the 1893-9^ winter the Association, whose actions greatly
influenced other roads, began efforts to establish a single, uniform
wage schedule throughout the nation.^
Despite its own national operations, policies, and impact, the
G.M.A. refused to recognize or negotiate with its nationally organised
opponent, the American Railway Union.

Ihe Strike Commission sharply

criticized this Association tactic, observing that such action
"...

seems arrogant and absurd when we consider its standing before the

law, its assumptions, and its past and obviously contemplated future

Chicago, Amended November l6, 1893»*' Proceedings of the General Managers*
Association of Chicago, 1893 and 189^ (Chicago, Illinois: Knight,
L e m a r d & Co.). Members of the organization included the Atchison,
Topeka and Santa Fe; the Baltimore and Ohio; the Calumet and Blue
Island; the Chicago and Alton; the Chicago and blrie; the Chicago euid
S a s t e m Illinois; the Chicago and Western Indiana; the Belt Railway of
Chicago; the Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway; the Chicago and NorthWestern; the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy; the Chicago, Milwaukee and
St. Paul; the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific; the Illinois Central; the
Louisville, New Albany and Chicago; the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern;
the Michigan Central; the New York, Chicago and St. Louis; the Pittsburg,
Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis; the Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne and
Chicago; the Wisconsin Central Lines; and the Wabash.
2u,S., Congress, Senate, U.S. Strike Commission Report, S. Mxec,
Doc, 7» 53rd Cong., 3d sess., 1894, pp. xxiii-xxvii, Ibe G.M.A. action
potentially affected over 220,000 employees who worked for Association
members as well as those of non-member roads which imitated the G.M.A.*s
wage policies. Lindsey, The Pullman Strike, pp. 114-20,
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action . . ."3
Organized in Chicago on June 20, 1393, the American Hailway Union's
organizational goal was the unification of all white railroad employees
into one union, which would have sufficient power to negotiate with the
increasingly centralized railroads.

The A.R.U.'s social objectives

included a desire to protect pay scales and hours of work and to lobby
for legislation generally beneficial to workers.
The union was formed along democratic lines.

Local memberships

elected regional delegates, who chose the union's national leaders at
the A.R.U.*s annual convention.

The national leaders, contrary to con

temporary popular opinion, had no authority to call a strike on any
railroad unless the affected local unions agreed.

Viewing the strike

tactic as only a last resort, the A.R.U. constitution outlined a fairly
elaborate grievance procedure designed to settle disputes without any
active confrontation.^
The A.R.U. experienced a rapid growth in membership in the first
year of its existence,

'The most spectacular increase occurred as a

result of the union's victory over James J. Hill's Great Northern Rail
road.

Responding to the Great Northern's drastic wage reductions

(August 1 8 9 3 » January 189 ^, and March 1894) on April 13» 1894, the
A.R.U. ordered a strike at the request of Great Northern employees.

3u.S. Strike Commission Report, p. xxxvi.
4lbid., pp. xxiii-xxvii; Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 110-13» Ray
Ginger, The Bending Cross; A Biography of Kugene Victor Debs (New
Brunswick, New Jersey; Rutgers University Press, 1949)7 pp. 92-95»
Despite some internal opposition, a majority of the union's membership
favored the racial bar, which satisfied racist prejudices as well as
fears of job competition from non-white workers.
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Although only a minority of the road's employees belonged to the union,
an overwhelming number of workers, including members of the railroad
brotherhoods, supported the strike and succeeded in paradyzing the road..
After one week. Hill agreed to submit the issue to a board of arbitra
tion,

The board, composed of fourteen St, Paul businessmen and headed

by Charles Pilsbury, decided unanimously in favor of the A.R.U. and
granted the strikers a wage increase which augmented the Great Rorthem's
monthly payroll by $1^6,000,

Victory swelled the American Railway

Union's ranks so that by the time of its first annual convention (June 1 2 ^
189^), the union boasted of a membership exceeding 150,000 in over 4-65
locals

The events which eventually precipitated the Pullman Strike
occurred in Pullman, Illinois,

Pullman, dubbed the "compulsory heaven"

by Ray Ginger,^ was a "company town," which was built, owned, main
tained, and controlled, by the Pullman Palace Car Company,

Convinced

that ", , , paternalism wisely administered would make labor more

^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp, 113-14'; Ginger, Bending Cross, pp,
102-14-, As estimated in the U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp.xxiiixxiv, the total number of railroad employees in the nation exceeded
8 5 0 ,0 0 0 man,
Ihe U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of
the United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 19^0), p. 4-27, suggested a similar figure. However, on
page 4-26, the Bureau also indicated that the definition of "employee"
included any ", . , person in the service of a railroad, subject to its
continuing authority to supervise and direct the manner of rendition of
his service," (excluding lawyers); thus, the 850,000 figure is some
what misleading, since it includes supervisory personnel, and, corre
spondingly, the percentage of railway laborers represented by the A.R.U.
was larger than the 850,000 figure indicates,
^Ray Ginger, Altgeld's America; The Lincoln Ideal Versus Changing
Realities (New York, New York; Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1958), p. 14-3.
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amenable to the interests of the corporation . . .

George Pullman

built what he and many others considered a model town in 1884.
Although the town was physically attractive and well-planned, a
mood of oppressive regimentation prevailed.

Determined to eliminate

"al.1 debasing influences," Pullman prohibited all saloons and brothels
within the town's limits; also determined to prevent heresy among his
employees, Pullman denied the use of public halls to anyone suspected of
being a "radical" or an "agitator," while he enlisted a number of loyal
employees to circulate among the population and report any disloyal
statements.

Finally, the Pullman Company owned all property within the

town and refused to sell any to its employees, thus reducing them to a
perpetual "tenant at will" status.®

After studying the town in 1884,

Richard T. i^y commented:
In looking over all the facts of the case, the conclusion
is unavoidable that the idea of Pullman is un-American. It is
a nearer approach than anything the writer has seen to what
appears to be the ideal of the Great German Chancellor, It is
not the American ideal. It is benevolent well-wishing feudal
ism, which desires the happiness of the people, but in such a
way as to please the authorities.9
An underlying problem, inherent in the paternalistic community,
gradually emerged during the months of September 1893 to May 1894, and

^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 35»
®Ibid., pp, 4 9 -9 0 passim. Other descriptions of life in Pullman,
Illinois, include the U.S. Strike Commission Report, pp. xxxii-xxxvij
William Carwardine, The Pullman Strike (New York, Rew lorK: Cnaries Kerr
Sc Co., 1 8 9 4 ), passim; Samual Yellen, American Labor Struggles (hew York,
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1936), pp. 101-8; Stanley Buder,
Pullman: An experiment in Industrial Order and Community Planning looO1930 (New York, Ne^w York; Oxford University Press, I96 ?), pp. r^y-ZoT,
passim; and Almont Lindsey, "Paternalism and the Pullman Strike,"
American Historical Review, vol. XLIV, no. 2 (January 1939), pp. 2?2-8 9 .
9Quoted in Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 86.
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resulted in the strike at Pullman.

During this period, the Pullman Com

pany reduced wages on an average of 25 percent.

However, Pullman refused

to lower rents (or dividends to the Pullman Company’s stockholders),
which ran approximately 20 to 25 percent higher than comparable rentals
in Ghicago and surrounding areas.
Caught in an economic squeeze between high rents and decreasing
wages, the Pullman workers formed a grievance committee which petitioned
the company to restore wages to the June 1(^5, level.

The company refused

and fired three committee members on May 10, 1894, on the grounds of
lack of work.

That evening, despite pleas of caution from A.R.U. offi

cials, the local union declared a strike and employed a force of 500 men
to guard the Pullman property— an action which the company alleged was
designed to prevent the use of "scab” labor.

Responding to the union’s

move, the Pullmétn Company idled the remaining 600 non-striking employees
and closed its works, which were not reopened until August 2, 1894,^^
Then, on June 15, the Pullman chapter of the American Railway Union
addressed the national convention, which had begun its proceedings on
July 12#

The workers explained:

without hope.

"We struck at Pullman because we were

We joined the American Railway Union because it gave us a

glimmer of hope . .

Petitioning for aid in its struggle, the chapter

requested that national organization to
. , . help us make our country better and more wholesome. Pull
us out of our slough of despond. Teach arrogant grinders of
the faces of the poor that there is still a God in Israel, and

10u,S, Strike Commission Report, pp, xxxii-xxxix, Almont Lindsey
disagreed, arguing that only three hundred workers remained (Pullman
Strike, p, 123). Regardless of the number, however, the Pullman Com
pany closed its operations and idled the remaining employees who refused
to strike.
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if need be a Jehovah— a God of battles. Do this,
and on that
last day you will stand, as we hope to stand, before the great
white throne "like gentlemen unafraid . .
ihe convention was moved to action by the Pullman workers* emo
tional appeal, wage cuts, national discrimination against the A.R.U.
and ".

. . a growing conviction that they were all at

the mercy ofthe

vested

interest which had drawn together by virtue of

business relations

and a common policy toward labor."^3

The convention appointed a commit

tee to meet with the Pullman Company, which subsequently refused its
offers.

In spite of the cautious and apprehensive advice of President

Eugene Debs and other A.R.U. leaders, the convention, after wiring its
local chapters, unanimously resolved to institute a national boycott of
Pullman cars unless that company adjusted the grievances with its employ
ees by noon, June 26.

No agreement was reached, and by June 28, 1894,

18,000 A.R.U. members were on strike.
The conflict escalated as the General Managers* Association entered
the fray.

The G.M.A. met in an emergency meeting on June 25— the day

before the threatened boycott— and unanimously resolved to resist the
boycott ” • . . i n the interest of their existing contracts [with the
Pullman Compan^ and for the benefit of the traveling public • . ."13

"Statement from the Pullman Strikers to the Convention of the
American Railway Union, June 15, 1894," U.S. Strike Commission Report,
pp.87-91,
l^Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law, p. 134.
^^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 132.
l^Ibid., pp. 128-34, Ultimately, over 125,000 men, including nonA.R.U. members, joined the boycott (Ginger, Bending Cross, pp. 122-23).
13proceedings of the General Managers* Association, June 25, 1894.
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Another and, perhaps, the primary rationale has heen suggested by Almont
Lindsey, who argued that the G.M.A. perceived a chance to destroy the
American Railway Union, whose victory over the Great Northern road
alarmed the members of the Association.1&
To lead the fight, the Association appointed John M. Egan, previ
ously manager of the Ghicago and Great Western Railroad.

As the G.M.A.

began firing any employee who refused to handle Pullman cars, the boy
cott was transformed into a national strike, paralyzing every transcon
tinental railroad except the Great Northern.

On June 29, the

Association resolved that none of its members would rehire any employee
fired as a result of the boycott.

Meanwhile, Egan established employment

agencies in Toledo, Cleveland, Buffalo, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Balti
more, New York, and Boston, to recruit non-union labor from the ample
ranks of the unemployed.^7
Nevertheless, on July 2, Egan admitted that the paralyzed railroads
had been "fought to a standstill."!8

Faced with defeat, the G.M.A.

began agitating for federal injunctions and troops.

Assessing the rail

road's position, Almont Lindsey observed:
A vital part of the strategy of the association was to draw
the United States government into the struggle and then to make
it appear that the battle was no longer between the workers and
the railroads but between the workers and the government.19

l&Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 136-39; see also Paul, Conservative
Crisis, p. 136 .
l?Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 139-^1; see also Proceedings of the
General Managers* Association. June 29-July 1, 1894.
l%,indsey, Pullman Strike, p. 144.
19ibid., p. 142.
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Ihe Association's request fell on sympathetic ears in Washington.
Alarmed by the general economic weakness, the increase of labor violence,
and frightened by exaggerated press reports of conditions in Chicago, the
Cleveland Administration moved quickly.

After two days,of violence at

Blue Island (Chicago)--neither supported nor encouraged by the American
Railway Union— the Federal District Court at Ghicago issued injunctions
enjoining A.R.U. leaders from "compelling or inducing by threats, intim
idation, persuasion, force or violence, railway employees to refuse or
fail to perform their duties."20
Working closely with the G.M.A., Assistant United States District
Attorney Edwin Walker attended the July 3 meeting of the Association.
He explained the ramifications of the injunction and requested the rail
roads to supply his office with evidence of its violation.

Walker also

disclosed that federal troops would soon arrive to enforce the court
order and that the military authorities " . . .

would be glad to have

suggestions concerning troop dispositions from the railways, as they
would be better advised than anyone else of the necessities . . ."21By July 4, federal troops, commanded by General Nelson A. Miles,
who was extremely hostile to organized
order of President Cleveland.

labor,

22 arrived in Chicago by

Rioting continued and reached its heighth

2Qibid., pp. 163-64.
21Proceedings of the General Managers* Association, July 3» 1894.
^^General Miles felt that within the Pullman Strike there existed
a ". . . danger of the overthrow or at least the paralysis of civil
government." Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic; Memoirs of the
Civil and Military Life of Nelson A. Miles (New York,"New York: Harper
& Bros., 1911), p. 254 .
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on July 6, when fire destroyed over $3^0,000 worth of railroad property
A highly prejudiced local and national press blamed the A.R.U.*s leader
ship for the violence.

However, the United States Commission, after a

thorough investigation, observed that union leaders realized that mob
action would merely lead to repression and defeat; the Commission also
declared:
There is no evidence before the commission that the offi
cers of the American Railway Union at any time participated in
or advised intimication, violence, or destruction of prop
erty . . .2^
Alarmed by the chaos in Chicago and on the transcontinental lines.
President Cleveland issued a proclamation on July 8 against the strikers
and increased the number of federal troops in the affected areas,
Meanwhile, the executive branch received severe criticism from a number
of mid-western and far western governors.
The most vehement protest came from Governor John Peter Altgeld of
Illinois.

In a series of angry telegrams on July $-6, Altgeld argued

that local and state authorities were able to maintain order in Illinois.
Further, the governor argued that since the state government had not

^^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 165-200.
2^U.S. Strike Commission Report, p. xlv; An early historian argued
that the violence resulted from the appearance of semi-criminal private
detectives hired by the railroads (Robert Hunter, Violence and the Labor
Movement (New York, New York* Macmillan Co., 191^3» P* 299)* Almont
Lindsey, however, suggested a somewhat broader explanation, arguing that,
although the arrival, of "detectives" and the military were an irritant,
greater factors were the accumulated resentments (caused by unemployment
and wa.ge reductions accompanying the depression) held by certain classes
against the railroads, combined with the presence of an abnormally large
number of "hoodlums, tramps, and semi-criminals," who had been drawn to
and stranded in Chicago by the Columbian Exposition (Lindsey, Pullman
Strike, p. 205).
25Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 211.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

16
requested federal troops, their appearance signified that " . . .

the

principle of self-government either never did exist in this country or
else it has been destroyed . • ."

Altgeld also warned.

Federal interference with industrial disturbances in the vari
ous states is . . . a new departure, and opens up so large a
field that it will require a very little stretch of authority^
to absorb to itself adl the details of local government • . .
In reply Cleveland maintained that he had not exceeded his authority and
had acted properly to ". . , restore obedience to law and to protect
life and property."2?
Ihe restoration of "obedience to law" included the arrest of Eugene
Debs and other high officials of the American Railway Union on charges
of conspiracy on July 10, 1894.

Meanwhile, in his zeal to obtain a con

viction, the United States Attorney at Chicago, Thomas Milchrist,
ordered an illegal raid on A.R.U. headquarters where deputy marshals and
deputy post office inspectors ransacked every room and confiscated all
union documents, including Debs* unopened personal mail.

Ihe next day

(July 11) Judge Grosscup reprimanded Milchrist and ordered that the

SÔTelegréun, Governor John Peter Altgeld to President Grove Cleveland
(July 6, 1894), Allan Nevins, ed.. Letters of Grover Cleveland, 1850-1908
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside P r e s s , 1933)» pp. 360-^1.

27Telegram, Cleveland to Altgeld (July 6, 1894), Ibid., pp. 361-64;
Cleveland published a formal defense of his actions in his book. The
Government in the Chicago Strike of 1894 (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1913)» Theformer president characterized
the Pullman Strike sus a "determined and ugly labor disturbance . . . ,"
which " . . . reached the entire Western and Southwestern sections of our
country. Railroad transportation was especially involved in its attacks.
The carriage of United States mails waa interrupted, interstate commerce
was obstructed, and railroad property was riotously destroyed . • ."
(pp. 2-3). As a result, Cleveland argued that " . . . conditions . . .
not only justified but actually obliged the Government to s t e m and
unusual measures in the assertion of its prerogatives . . ." (p. 12).
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pQ

materials be returned.
Confronted by a hostile national government openly allied with its
adversary, its leaders in jail, the A.R.U. in Chicago was defeated by
July 13.29

Nevertheless, President Debs still dreamed of victory.

He

looked to the West for support in a last ditch effort to defeat the
railroads and preserve the new union.

On July I5 Debs optimistically

(amd erroneously) forecasts
We will win our fight in the West because we are better
organized there, ihere is brawn and energy in the West. Men
there are loyal, fraternal., amd true. When they believe they
are right, they aCLl go out amd stay out until the fight is
over . . . We will show the general managers that the attempt
to crush organized labor will result in receivership for all
their railroads.30

2%jindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 278-79. Walker’s superior. United
States Attorney General Richard Olney, desired to crush the strike.
However, Olney vehemently condemned Walker’s raid as an illegal and
unethical means to that end (Gerald G. Sggert, Richard Olney; Evolution
of a Statesman CUniversity Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 197 ^ » pp. 147-48).
29Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 232.
30lbid.. p. 235 .
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CHAPTER III

THE STRIKE IN MONTANA

Montana, like most of the country, gave little notice to the Pull
man workers* plight until the struggle attained national and, for the
American Railway Union, catastrophic proportions.

Until the strike

reached the state, Montanans were primarily concerned with the continu
ing 1893 depression, national unemployment, Goxeyite marches, the HelenaAnaconda capital fight. Populism, and the approaching fall elections.
Railway services, vital to the isolated and sparsely populated
state, seemed relatively secure.

The previous spring had witnessed the

use of a peaceful, legal me thod--arbi trati on— to settle the Great North
ern Strike.

There existed, then, a recent example that reason, rather

than the horrors of class warfare or confrontation, could prevail as the
country and the new state underwent the transition from a predominately
agricultural to an industrial society.
Responding to the national depression, the Great Northern had
slashed wages to the point that its employees were the lowest paid work
ers on any transcontinental railroad.

Ihe infant American Railway Union,

representing only a minority of unskilled Great Northern employees,
demanded a restoration of wages in early April 1894.
However, James J. Hill, president of the Great Northern, refused to
make any concessions, and a strike swiftly followed.

Even the skilled

18
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laborers of the railroad brotherhoods joined in a gigantic, peaceful
effort which virtually paralyzed the Great Northern.

After eighteen

days, both Debs and Hill agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration.

A

board, composed of businessmen from St. Paul and Minneapolis and chaired
by Charles Pilsbury, granted nearly all the A.R.U. demands, including a
monthly wage increase of $146,000 for the road's employees.^
In the crisis-laden atmosphere of the 1890s, this example of a
peaceful, non-violent settlement of labor disputes offered a glimmer of
hope to alarmed, fearful Montanans.

Indeed, when the Pullman Boycott

unleashed its full fury in the state, the overwhelming majority of news
papers, regardless of political affiliation or philosophical stance,
urged arbitration as a means of settlement.^

^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 113-14. For more information of the
Great Northern Railroad Strike of 1894 see U.S. Strike Commission Report,
pp. 134-35» £iugene Victor Debs, Debs: His Life, Writings, and Speeches
(New York, New York: Charles H. Kerr & Co., I9 O8 ), pp. ?-10j Ginger,
Bending Cross, pp. 102-6; Eggert, Richard Olney, pp. 127-31.
^The favorable attitude of the state's principal newspapers toward
the strikers was somewhat of an oddity, since the "Copper Kings" con
trolled the major publications in Montana. By 1888 W . A. Clark con
trolled the Butte Miner, and in I 89I Marcus Daly obtained control of the
Anaconda Standard, which was the largest and most influential paper in
the state (john M. Schiltz, "Montana's Captive Press," Montana Opinion»
vol. 1, no. 1 fJune 195^» PP* 3-4). The spectacle of such anti-union
capitalists allying with labor against the Northern Pacific and Montana
Union railroads was a highly unusual phenomenon of which the cause(s) is
still unclear. Thomas A. Clinch suggested a partial explanation by
observing that the Northern Pacific was attempting to claim a substantial
portion of the state's mineral lands under its land grant charter
(Thomas A. Clinch, "The Northern Pacific Railroad auid Montana's Mineral
Lands," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 34, no. 3» pp. 323-35» passim).
Since the Northern Pacific threatened the large mining interests, then,
it is quite understandable for those interests to ally with the strikers
during the Pullman Boycott in a continuing attempt to discredit the rail
roads and the Cleveland Administration (the silver mine owners were
opposed to the "Gold Democrats" and later participated in Populist
efforts to elect William Jennings Bryan in I 896).
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As previously noted, the Pullman conflict initially aroused rela
tively little interest in the state.

Typical was a sraaJLl notice in the

Weekly Missoulian, reporting that **• , . one hundred brick-makers
employed by the Pullman company struck t o d a y . T h e calm was deceptive,
however.

In the short space of forty-eight hours, traffic on the entire

Northern Pacific Railroad was at a standstill.
The American Railway Union convention, meeting in Chicago, ordered
a boycott against all Pullman cars at noon, June 26, 1894.

Learning that

the Northern Pacific had discharged several men for obeying that order in
St, Paul, the appointed representatives of the Livingston, Montana, local
warned J . D. Finn, Superintendent of the Montana Division of the Northern
Pacific Railroad, that unless the discharged men were immediately rein
stated, the entire division would strike at midnight, June 2?.

Although

the A.R.U. would allow mail trains to continue operating, its membership
would refuse to operate any other Northern Pacific locomotive.^
Although the less skilled workers, such as fireman, formed the bulk
of the A.R.U.*s membership, the union's threat was, nevertheless, clear
to the Northern Pacific management.

Though the company's engineers

belonged to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers rather than to the
A.R.U., they were pledged to work only with experienced firemen.

Exper

ienced non-union labor would have to be recruited and imported from dis
tant terminals before the Northern Pacific could resume operations.
J. W. Kendrick, General Manager of the Northern Pacific, accepted

^Weekly Missoulian, vol. 25» no. 22 (May 30, 1894), p. 1.
^Telegram, Eugene V. Debs to R. F. Doherty (June 26, 1894), repro
duced in the Anaconda Standard, vol. 5, no. 297 (June 27, 1894), p. 1.
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the challange and adamantly denied the legitimacy of the union's demands.
In Livingston he announced:
The Northern Pacific owns an undivided one half interest in
all the Pullman cars which run over its tracks at present. An
interference with the running of these cars is, therefore, an
interference with the property of this road. The dining cars
and all other cars are the property of the receivers of this
railroad. I am not informed that the American Railway Union
has any grievance against the Northern Pacific railroad, there
fore there seems to be no reason for an extension of the boy
cott to cars in which the road has an interest and joint
ownership.5
Confronted with Kendrick's statement and his subordinate's (Superinten
dent Finn) refusal to detach the Pullman cars from two trains, including
one routed for Yellowstone Park, Livingston's union men, followed by sym
pathetic dispatchers, struck at 12:30 A.M., July 2?.

R. F. Doherty, an

official of the Livingston chapter, immediately notified Debs of the
event and urged him to

• • call out the entire system at once

Already begun on the Minnesota Division, the strike quickly spread
throughout Montana.

Superintendent Finn met with the Livingston strike

committee at 1:30 P.M., June 2? in a last minute attempt to prevent the
escalation of the conflict from a simple boycott of Pullman cars to a
full-scale strike, which would mean a complete halt of activity on the
Northern Pacific line.

The union reiterated its position that the

strike could end immediately if the St. Paul men were reinstated,
although the Pullman boycott would remain in force.

However, Finn dashed

any hopes for compromise by casually replying, "Well, I guess you fellows

^Reproduced in the Helena Independent, vol. 35# no. 128 (June 2?,
1894), p. 1.
^Telegram, R. F. Doherty to Debs, Anaconda Standard, vol. 5» no. 297
(June 27, 1894), p. 1.
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will remain idle a long time."

Later that afternoon. Debs ordered all

union employees to quit work immediately and to appoint local committees
to supervise strike activities.^
Local responses were rapid and decisive.
Pacific was completely paralyzed.

By 5*00 P.M. the Northern

Within Montana, the Butte, Anaconda,

Helena, and Missoula locals immediately joined chapters on the Yellow
stone and Montana Divisions of the Northern Pacific.®

During these ini

tial stages, the A.R.U. gained support from other quarters.

The Order

of Railway Conductors in Livingston unanimously agreed to openly support
the strike.

Although the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, also in

Livingston, initially denied that it was a party to the conflict, the
Brotherhood’s membership refused to work with inexperienced "scab" labor
and, thus, reinforced the strikers* position by their neutrality.

Also,

relatively large numbers of previously unorganized railroad workers
reportedly entered the A.R.U.*s membership rolls throughout the state.9
That same day (June 27), the Butte chapter of the Américain Railway
Union quickly exceeded the national, organization*s desires and extended
the conflict to the Montana Union Railroad, a branch line of the Union
Pacific Railroad C o m p a n y . A w a r e of recent bitter labor disputes and of

7Ibid., no. 298 (June 28, 1894-), p. 1 ; Helena Independent, vol. 35»
no. 129 (June 28, 1894), p. 8.
Q

The Northern Pacific System in Montana was divided into three area®
the Yellostone Division (Glendive to Billings), the Montana Division
(Billings to Helena), and the Rocky Mountain Division (Helena to Missoula).
9Anaconda Standard, no. 298 (June 28, 1894), p. 1; Helena Indepen
dent, no. 129 (June 28, 1894), p. 8.
^*^The Montana Union road ran north and south from Butte, Montana, to
its intersection with the Union Pacific’s main line at Ogden, Utah.
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the increasingly national scope of the current battle, the Butte workers
felt that the Pullman issue involved far more than the rights of Pullman
workers themselves.

Rather, they believed the conflict was ", . . a

decisive battle between the corporations and the American Railway Union,
and . . , [WereQ prepared for a long and bitter fight.
Conforming to this view, J. H. Galderhead, President of the Butte
Chapter of the American Railway Union, telegraphed the local chapter in
Ogden, Utah, and urged them to boycott any northbound Pullman cars.

The

Butte strike committee simultaneously informed W. H. Bum s , General Man
ager of the Montana Union company, that no more Pullman cars would be
handled by A.R.U, members until a settlement was reached in

Chicago.

12

Sympathy for the Pullman workers and loyalty to the leadership of
the American Railway Union, while powerful motivations in themselves,
cannot fully explain the Montana chapters' support for the Chicago boy
cott.

Another and, perhaps, the most important issue surfaced immedi

ately.

In December 1893» the Northern Pacific announced, as did

railroads throughout the country, a 5 to 10 percent wage reduction.

The

railroad's disregard of employee organizations further inflamed labor's
dissatisfaction— the Northern Pacific management had simply announced
the new wage schedules without negotiating with older brotherhoods or
the Infant A.R.U, locals.1^

1Anaconda Standard, vol. 5» uo. 298 (June 28, 189^), p. 1. The
strike committee also informed the smaller, local lines— i.e., the Mon
tana Central and the Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific (B.A.&P.)— of the
union's position.
IZlbid.
^3tfeekly Missoulian, vol. 23» no. 51 (December 20, 1893)» p. 6.
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24In early January 1894, as the workers threatened to strike over
such high-handed practices, the Northern, Pacific receivers sought a fed
eral injunction.

On December 29, 1893, a federal writ was issued,

enjoining all Northern Pacific employees from striking or otherwise
interfering with the operation of the Northern Pacific Railroad after
January 1, 1894--the date the new wa^e schedules went into effect.
Although the strike was temporarily prevented, the issue smoldered
until the summer of 1894, when it was almost immediately revived during
the first week of the Pullman Strike.

Throughout the state, localsizian-

imously demanded a restoration of the pre-January 1894 wage schedules as
a condition of settlement.

Encouraged by the A.R.U. success against the

Great Northern, the Missoula, Montana chapter led the way on June 27 in
vocalizing this demand.15

By June 30, the Livingston, Helena, Billings,

and Glendive locals had followed suit.l^
In the wage issue, as in the threatened extension of the strike to
the Montana Union road, the strikers clearly exceeded the desired bounds
and strategy of the national headquarters.

On June 28, Debs futilely

wired J. W. Naugle, Chairman of the Butte Strike Committee, that
. . . We request that this matter (restoration of wages] be
postponed and our whole attention devoted to the Pullman boy
cott. When it is won, restoration of wages will be an easy

l^Ibid., vol. 34, no. 1 (January 3, 1894), p. 1.

15Anaconda Standard, no. 298 (June 28, 1894), p. 1.
1^Ibid«, vol. 5, no, 299 (June 29, 1894), p. 1; the Billings
Gazette, vol. 10, no. 9 (June 30, 1894), p. 1; the Helena Independent,
vol. 35, no. 131 (June 30, 1894), p. 5î the Livingston Post, voll 3,
no. 12 (June 28, 1894), p. 3î and the Weekly Missoulian, vol. 35, no. 2?
(July 4, 1894), p. 3 .
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matter • . ."1?
However, Debs* caution proved an insufficient bar to the Montana stikers;
their demand for a restoration of the 1893 schedules continued to be a
burning and unifying issue.

Although not adamantly opposed to an extension of the boycott to
the Montana Union, Debs, as well as a number of the railroad’s employ
ees, hoped that a direct conflict could be avoided by cooperation
between the road and the American Railway Union.

Since the parent Union

Pacific owned a large number of Wagner sleepers, it was hoped that the
road would substitute them for its Pullman cars and, thus, void a con
frontation.^®
Such hopes proved illusory.

The Union Pacific attached Pullman

cars to two northbound trains, despite the announced June 30 boycott on
the Union Pacific and Montana Union lines.

Pursuant to their resolu

tions, the Butte chapter declared a general strike at 6:00 P.M., June 30.
President Debs quickly endorsed the action in a telegram to Galderhead:
All Union Pacific employes are requested to leave the service
immediately. Several points on that system are now tied up.
Several men have been discharged for refusing to handle Pull
man cars, but they may be assured there will be no settlement
on any basis until each man on every road is reinstated. This
is a fight to the finish aigainst combined capital and oppres
sion and we are sure winners. Do no violence but every man
quit and stand firm . . . Chicago is paralyzed. Strike
extends to Columbus, Ohio . . .^9

^'^Anaconda Standard, vol. 5» no. 299 (June 29, 189^), p. 1; Lindsey,
Pullman Strike, p. 219.
^®Anaconda Standard, vol. 5, no. 300 (June 30, 1894), p. 1.
I9%bid,, no. 301 (July 1, I 894), p. 1; the Butte Miner, vol. 31» no.
182 (July 1, 1894), p. 5 .
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While the American Railway Union's membership girded itself for the deci
sive battle, the opposing railroads, led by the powerful General. Manages*
Association of Chicago, also mobilized.

The Union Pacific's interests,

and, thus, the Montana Union's, were directly represented in that body.
Of greater significance to the Montana scene, however, was the
Northern Pacific's position.

The Northern Pacific, with its eastern

terminal at St. Paul, Minnesota, was not formally a member of the G.M.A.,
since membership in that body was restricted to those roads centering or
having terminals in Chicago.

Nevertheless, Northern Pacific interests

were considered and promoted by connecting roads such as the Chicago and
Great Western Railway and the Chicago and Northern Pacific Railway.
A few days after the declaration of a national boycott, J. W.
Kendrick, General Manager of the Northern Pacific, appealed directly to
the G.M.A.

Bypassing indirect channels, Kendrick requested the Associa

tion to extend sympathetic assistance to the Northern Pacific in com
batting the strikers on his road.

Although the precise nature of that

request is unclear, the minutes of the June 29 meeting of the G.M.A.
indicate that its members vowed

. . to do ainything it ^he Associat i o j

could for his j^Kendrick'sJ

"20

c o m p a n y .

Subsequent events, such as legal

maneuvers, calls for federal troops, and the importation of non-union,
eastern workers, indicate that the Northern Pacific received a great deal
of advice and aid from the Association.

Certainly, that road used methois

strikingly similar to those of the General Managers' Association in
defeating the American Railway Union.

20proceedings of the General Managers' Association of Chicago, 1893
and 1894-, June 29, 1894.
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GHAPTSR IV
INTERLUDE AND CHARACTERISTICS

After the strike was in force, there followed a brief lull in Mon
tana while the various factions plotted strategy or simply awaited the
events which would force the moment of decision.

To a large extent, the

activities and vocalized opinions of this brief period revealed Mon
tanans* attitudes toward that conflict.^
A large, geographically isolated, and sparsely populated state,
Montana was heavily dependent on its transportation network.

The prin-

cipaüL industries were agriculture, lumber, and mining, which required a
rail system to provide access to distant markets.

Within Montana

itself, a transportation system was also imperative for farmers to mar
ket their products in the state's scattered towns.

Any substantial

interference, with the state's railroad network would necessarily affect
its economy.2

Although the Great Northern continued operations (it was

^As in the previous chapter, most of the source materials for this
chapter are drawn from local newspapers since available papers, records,
etc., are very limited or in many cases, nonexistent for this period.
However, these newspapers can be seen as reflective of their reader
ship's opinions to a large extent, since most of them were relatively
small, independent publications which were dependent on local circula
tion and support.
2ln his book. Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana; A Narra
tive of Ideology in Political Acticn (Missoula. Montana: the University
of Montana Press, 1970), p. 20, Thomas Clinch explained: "Transporta
tion was a vital factor in Montana's economic development . . . the

27
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the only transcontinental road to do so), the closure of the Northern
Pacific and the Montana Union, a branch.of the Union Pacific, immedi
ately daanaged local economies.
In the eastern part of the state, Glendive, a railroad town near
the Montana-North DaJcota border, quickly ran dangerously low on food
supplies.

By the end of the first week of the strike, the town's stores

were nearly bariren of staple foods tuffs. 3
Cattlemen near Miles City and Billings feared "disasterous” losses
would result from the Northern Pacific tieup,^

Sheepmen in Billings

were unable to store wool in the Northern Pacific's warehouses; since
the Northern Pacific's storage facilities were overflowing. Agent
Talbott refused to accept further shipments until a settlement was
reached with the American Railway Union,5

The strike also forced retail

business into a severe slump within a week.^
One side effect beneficial to Billings' residents resulted from the
tieup, however.

Several carloads of perishable foods— bananas, vega-

tables, and poultry— were stranded on Billings' sidetracks awaiting
settlement of the strike.

Rather than allow those items to rot. Agent

advent of quartz-mining and the growth of cattle and sheep raising
demanded railroad transportation," For additional information regarding
the railroads* impact on Montana, see Rex G, Myers, "Montana: A State
and Its Relation with Railroads, 1864— 1970" (Ph,D, dissertation. Univer
sity of Montana, 1972), passim,
^Daily Gazette (Billings, Montana), vol. 1, no, 6 (July 9» 1894*),
p. 3.
^Helena Independent, vol. 35» no. 139 (July 8, 1894), p, 1,
3paily Gazette, no, 1 (July 2, 1894), p. 3,
^Ibid., no. 8 (July 11, 1894), p. 3.
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Talbott served what the Billings Gazette labelled a "feast of famine,"
at which two thousand people received a full meal for a minimal price.7
Farther west, the Big Timber Pioneer complained that the strike
hurt sheepmen and fruit growers.8

Although there was little perishable

freight in the Bozeman yards,^ the fertile Gallatin Valley suffered eco
nomic hardships.

Ihough sympathetic to the A.R.U. cause, the Bozeman

Chronicle warned that the area's ranchers, unable to sell their crops of
oats or cattle, anticipated economic disaster, while local fruit growers
faced a nearly total loss on their cash crops.^^

Overtly hostile to the

strikers, the Bozeman Avant-Courier thundered *
It is costing the great northwest at least a million dollars a
day in the loss of business, destruction and depreciation of
property, enforced idleness of thousands of people and the
shutting down and closing up of mills, mines, smelters and man
ufacturers . .
The Avant-Gourier*s pronouncement was somewhat exaggerated, since
the newspapers of the state's mining regions noted only minimal economic
repercussions resulting from the strike.

In Helena, which wais also ser

viced by the Great Northern road, residents experienced few

h a r d s h i p s .

Southwest of Helena, the Butte/Anaconda area experienced a sharp rise in

?Billings Gazette, vol. 10, no. 11 (July 7» 1894), p. 5»
% i g Timber Pioneer, vol. 4, no. 32 (July 12, 1894), p. 4.
9Anaconda Standard, vol. 5. no. 299 (June 30, 1894), p. 1.
lOBozeman Chronicle, vol. 12, no. 22 (July 5» 1894), p. 4.
11Avant-Gourier (Bozeman, Montana), vol. 23, no. 34 (July 14, 1894),

p. 2 .
l^Helena Independent, vol. 35, no. 129 (June 28, 1894), p. 8.
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food prices despite its indirect access to the Great Northern.

In a sin

gle twenty-four hour period (July 2-July 3)» egg prices doubled.

Also,

the price of hay, grain, and feed rose materially, while strawberries
rose from $ 2.50 to $4.00 per case.13
Confronted by skyrocketing prices and by the fact that Butte stores
had stockpiled only two to three days of provisions, a number of Butte
residents became understandably apprehensive.

However, the Great North

ern continued supplying the town, and by July 8, local farmers had begun
supplementing the food supply by driving in fresh supplies of cattle and
sheep daily.

Although shortages of salt and pork continued, the strike*s

effects remained merely "noticeable but in no way distressing."!^
Mining operations in the Butte/Anaconda area were only minimally
affected.

Firms such as Marcus Daly's Anaconda Company and the Boston

and Montana Mine had stockpiled a month's supply of timber and fuel.^^
Only the Parrot Smelter, heavily dependent on the Montana Union for its
fuel supply, was forced to suspend operations.!^

Other mines, including

F. Augustus Heinze's properties, were unaffected by the strike.!^
Located near the Montana-Idaho border, Missoula was affected to a
greater extent.

Farmers in the surrounding Bitter Root and Missoula

valleys suffered noticeably.

Fruit growers had just finished their har

vest, and tons of strawberries and other perishable foods rotted as the

!3Anaconda Standard, no. 304 (July 4, 1894), p. 1.
I4ibid.,

no.309 (July 9, 1894), p. 4.

!^Ibid.,

no.302 (July 2, 1894), p. 1.

^^Ibid.,

no.307 (July ?, 1894), p. 1.

!7lbid.,

no.309 (July 9, 1894),

p. 4.
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strike continued.^®

Reportedly, farmers were losing one thousand dollars

a day on the strawberry crop alone, while losing an additional one thou
sand dollars a day on other perishable agricultural products.19

The

Northern Pacific tieup also injured the area's lumber industry, forcing
the large saw mills in neighboring Bonner and Hamilton to suspend opera
tions until rail service resumed.20

Although serious food shortages

were averted, large retail establishments, such as the Missoula Mercan
tile Company, reported a substantial drop in sales, while some items—
e.g., sugar— doubled within a twenty-four hour period.21

Given the immediate impact on Montana's economy as well as the
spectre of certain economic disaster if the strike lasted very long, one
would expect an extreme anti-A.R.U. sentiment from most of the state's
residents, accompanied by demands for a forcible settlement of the
strike.

Such views certainly emerged, particularly in the livestock

raising areas near Miles City, Billings, and, to some extent, Bozeman.
Surprisingly, however, a majority of these westerners, including small
farmers— who probably suffered the most from the tieup— heartily sup
ported the American Railway Union's cause or were at least sympathetic
toward the strikers.

18ibid., no. 298 (June 29* 189^), p. 1* Daily Tribune (Great Falls,
Montana), vol. 16, no. 329 (July 1, 1894), p. 2; Helena Independent, no.
131 (June 28, 1894), p. 1; Weekly Missoulian. no. 27 (July 4, 1894),
p. 4,
l9Helena Independent, no. 130 (June 29, 1894), p. 5,
20weekly Missoulian. no. 2? (July 4, 1894), p. 4; Helena Independent,
no. 134 (July 3* 1894), p. 1.
Zlweekly Missoulian. no. 2? (July 4, 1894). n. 4; Daily Tribune, no.
320 (July 1, 1894), p. 2.
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The citizens of Glendive, a small railroad center surrounded by
agricultural interests, generally supported the strike.

The seventy-

five members of the small A.R.U. local "jubilantly" walked of their jobs
during the early morning of June 28.

A relatively large number of

unskilled non-union men simultaneouly quit in sympathy.22

Two days later

(June 30), the town's conductors, engineers, firemen, and trainmen, vowed
to support the union until the strike ended.^3

Zealots also began a new

paper, the American Railway Union Striker, on June 29»^^

Within this

heady atmospheire, the established Glendive Independent sagely advised
the strikers to
. . . Act as a unit, have no divided councils and be prepared
to fight to a finish. If you do this it will materially
shorten the struggle, for the other side will know that united
you are impregnable and will yield the sooner, the battle will
be over and victory perch upon your banners. Stand by one
another, not only here at Glendive, but from the Atlantic to
the Pacific, from the lakes to the gulf, and heed well the
advice and council of those you have placed in authority.^3
Public sentiment was more divided in Billings.
Northern Pacific workers supported the strike.

Certainly, the

Following the example of

other chapters, three hundred men, including non-union employees, had
walked off the job.^^

Alarmed by the drift of public sentiment against

the railroad, the editor of the Daily Gazette vocalized conservative
apprehensions when he warned that the Populist ranks would grow immensely

^^Anaconda Standard, no. 298 (June 29, 1894), p. 1 ; Helena
Independent, no. 130 (June 29, 1894), p. 5 ,
^^Anaconda Standard, no. 299 (June 30, 1894), p. 1.
^^Glendive Independent, vol. 9, no. 2 (June 30, 1894), p. 3.

23lbld.. p. 2.
2^ i l y Gazette, vol. 1, no. 1 (July 3, 1894), p. 2.
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from an A.R.U, victory
Reverend J. W. Jennings, on the other hand, urged his Methodist con
gregation to support the American Railway Union strike.

On July 1, the

first Sunday of the strike. Reverend Jennings delivered a sermon enti
tled, "What are the Poor Man's Rights?" to an overflowing audience.
Church attendance on that particular Sunday was so great that Jennings
was compelled to open the windows so a large group on the lawn could
heaar his sermon.

In his oration, the minister compared the strike to

the Boston Tea Party and damned
the present party in power |which] has apostatized from
#
#
*
the faith of the Jacksonian fathers, for instead of being now
the defenders of the rights of the people against aggression
and oppressive corporations, trusts, etc., they are the pliant
tools of the codfish monied aristocracy who seek to dominate
this country and endanger the overthrow of our American insti
tutions
. , . Ihese rights (inalienable rights of life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) no corporation or
money power haa any right to deprive the poorest laborer of,
or in any way to abridge . . . No man or set of men have any
right to monopolize the means of subsistence autid dictate to
the poor the very terms of life . . .28
Refusing to confine his activities to the pulpit, Jennings later
addressed an open meeting of the A.R.U. where he expounded his views on
the relationship of Christian Socialism to contemporary American society.
The local chapter in turn passed a resolution thanking the reverend and
J. D. Matheson, editor of the newly inaugurated Daily Times, for their
"fairmess and impartiality" during a time of nationauL hysteria and

27lbld., no. 11 (July 11, 189^), p. 2.
^%illings Gazette, no. 11 (July 7, 1894), p. 1; the complete text
of Reverend Jennings' sermon was printed by the Daily Times (Billings,
Montana), vol. 1, no. ? (July 7, 1894), pp. 1 & 4.
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widespread attacks on organized labor.29
By its relatively impartial and fair reporting, the Times certainly
helped the A.R.U. cause in eastern Montana.

Refusing to imitate the

extremely biased and exaggerated reporting in Chicago, Matheson calmly
reported on local conditions.

For example, in a July 5 editorial, he

commented that
So far as our own townsmen are concerned
this strike, they axe keeping within the
serving the best of order. They contend
grievances adjusted by peaceful methods,
true American citizens . . .3^
The Daily Gazette was more alarmed.

who are taking part in
bounds of law and pre
that they have serious
as becomes good and

Although Becker noted the calm

situation in Billings, he feared that the violent example of Chicago
would spread.

To prevent a nightmare of national violence, he called

for martial law and compulsory arbitration, since *' ^]he very existence
of government is at staike."^^

West of Billings, local newspapers

expressed sympathy for the poorly paid workers but, nevertheless, con
demned the strike, since it hurt innocent livestock and agricultural
interests.

To correct the situation, the Big Timber Pioneer and the

Stillwater Bulletin echoed Populist demands for government ownership of
railroads.32
Public sentiment in Livingston, the most militant point in the
state, favored the American Railway Union cause.

The Anaconda Standard,

29pally Times, no. 5 (July 5» 1894), p. 3»
30lbid., p. 2.
31Daily Gazette, no. 2 (July 3* 1894), p. 2.
32sig Timber Pioneer, no. 32 (July 12, 1894), p. 4; Stillwater
Bulletin (Columbus, Montana), vol. 2, no. 41 (July 7, 1894), p. 4.
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which maintained a news bureau in Livingston, reported that
Ihe strikers have the sympathy of nine-tenths of the people
Lin Livingston] . The farmers especially are with the railroad
boys . . . and a number of the tillers of the soil in this
vicinity have generously offerred to contribute quantities of
vegatables and other farm products to the American Railway
Union if any outside assistance should be desired.33
Organized labor also supported the strikers.

As previously noted,

the local chapter of the Order of Railway Conductors unanimously voted
to support the boycott.

The conductors* action was especially diffi

cult, since they were ineligible for the fifty dollars per month stipend
from the national organization, which had not endorsed the strike,3^
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers modified its neutral stance of
June 2? and expressed its sympathy to the strikers, pending a decision
of the grand lodge.35

The local chapter of the Brotherhood of Railway

Trainmen faced a somewhat greater dilemma.

W. A. Sheehan, Grand Secre

tary and Treasurer of the B.R.T., forbade the chapter to strike.

Refus

ing to obey that order, the local, opted to disband and support the
American Railway Union on the evening of July 2.3&
The town's newspaper, the Livingston Post, expressed sympathy for
the A.R.U. on both

a national and a local level. As early as June 28,

the Post's editor, Walter Anderson, commented:
The boycott is
on in earnest, and no Pullmancars will be
allowed to pass over the various railroads of the country until
Pullman recognizes the truth of the maxim, "The laborer is

33Anaconda Standard, no. 303 (July 3» 189^), p. 1.
3^Ibid.
35nelena Independent, no. 131 (June 30, 1894), p. 1.
36ibid., no. 135 (July 3» 1894), p. 1; Anaconda Standard, no. 303
(July 3, 1894), p. 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

36
worthy of his hire.”
. . . It is not the province of the Post to sit in judg
ment on the action of the strikers. They are supposed to be
more thoroughly posted in regard to their grievances than out
siders caji possibly be. The railroad companies, if they act
wisely, will go to the utmost limit of their ability in set
tling their grievances . . .37
Anderson also enthusiastically supported local efforts in the state:
The A.R.U. is going to make a clean sweep while they are about
it, and the Post bids them God-Speed. Ihe railroad boys have
rights which the company must respect, and that they will win
in the end hardly admits of a doubt.38
Popular sympathy for the strikers was also evident in Bozeman,
despite a strong current of opposition represented by the Avant-Gourier.
The town's mayor and other influential citizens publicly endorsed the
strike at an open A.R.U. meeting on July 1.39

The Avant-Gourier ada

mantly denied that those gentlemen represented the views of the town:
"We believe our citizens generally are inclined to be non-committal.”^^
The validity of the Courier's observations is questionable, howevei;
since (l) the Anaconda Standard, with a local, news bureau, felt that
Bozeman generally endorsed the strike, and (2) the Courier's editor hys
terically forecast that socialism and the destruction of organized
capital would result from an A.R.U. victory.

Further, the Courier

ignored the loose, democratic structure of the American Railway Union
and erroneously characterized its leader as ” . . . Generalissimo Debs,
whose authority over his subjects, the members of the American Railway

37Llvingston Post, vol. 6, no. 12 (June 28, 1894), p. 2.
38lbid., p. 3*

39Anaconda Standard, no. 302 (July 2, 1894), p. 1.
^QAvant-Courier, no. 34 (July 14, 1894), p. 2.
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Union, appears to be as absolute as that of the czar of Russia • •
A second newspaper, the Bozeman Chronicle, espoused a more moderate
and, probably, a more accurate position.

While noting the damag;e to

cattlemen and fruit growers, the Chronicle emphasized the strikers*
restraint and their close identification " . . .
the city."

with the interests of

Refusing to support the A.R.U.*s strike, however, the paper

advised railroad employees to seek their relief through arbitration.^^
In the state's principal mining region— including Butte, Anaconda,
and Helena— the strike received substantial support from organized labor
and the principal newspapers.

On June 30, the Silverbow Trades and Labor

Assembly extended moral and financial support to the A.R.U.^3

ihe Butte

Typographical Union, Number 126, fearing that an A.R.U. defeat would
injure organized labor for years, resolved to ". . . tender to the Amer
ican Railway Union the fullest measure of moral sympathy and pledges, if
called upon, its financial support."^

Similarly, the Cigar Makers Union

of Butte Pledged " jtjo extend to the American Railway Union our sympathy,
and pledge ourselves to aid them in every honorable and lawful manner,
both morally and

financially

."^5

Finally, although the A.R.U. employees

Ibid. Actually, the A.R.U. was rather loosely organized— a factor
which hindered its effort in combatting the well organized and highly cen
tralized General Manag;ers* Association— U.S. Strike Commision Report, pp.
xxvi-xxvii.
42Bozeman Chronicle, vol. 12, no. 22 (July 5» 1894), p. 4.
^3Butte Miner, vol. 31, no. 182 (July 1, 1894), p, 5»
^Anaconda Standard, no. 302 (July 2, 1894), p. 1.
45lbid., no. 304 (July 4, 1894), p. 1.
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of the Great Northern refused to join the strike, a large number sympa
thized with the strikers; one example of their concern occurred on
July 10 when a number of employees refused to handle Montana Union
freight, which had to be moved by wagon
In Anaconda, the Western Union operators struck on July 1 because
the wires were being used for the transmission of railroad business
Also, Reverend P. Lowry of Anaconda publicly endorsed the strike and
warned his congregation that the success of organized labor's efforts to
obtain a fair wage was imperative if the country hoped to avert class
warfare and revolution.^8
Ihe strikers enjoyed the sympathy, though not the overt support, of
the area's newspapers.

The Anaconda Standard, boasting the largest cir

culation in the state, provided complete national, and regional coverage
of the strike.

Using handcars, the Standard's employees distributed the

latest news throughout the state, thus keeping the various local chapters
well informed.^9

By printing the full texts of resolutions, policy

statements, etc., of A.R.U. positions (as well as those of the railroads j»
especially those counseling orderliness and restraint, the Standard
helped allay exaggerated fears and popular hysteria throughout the
state— in marked contrast to many national papers which fostered and

4 6ibid., no. 311 (July 11, 189^), p. 6.
^^Weekly Missoulian. no. 1 ? (July 4-, 1894), p. 1.
^ ^Anaconda Standard, no. 309 (July 9, 1894), p. 3,
^9on June 29» 1894, the Standard began its "handcar deliveries" to
Billings, Livingston, Bozeman, Missoula, and smaller points on the North
ern Pacific and Montana Union railroads— Ibid.. no. 300 (June 30, 1894),
p. 1.
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encouraged those very attitudes.3^

Ihough declining to publicly support

the strike itself, the Standard did defend the character of the strikers,
declaring that they " . . .

are showing constantly that they have the

interests of the community at heart."31
More sympathetic to the A.R.U. cause was the Butte Miner, which
demanded that Pullman consent to arbitration so that a rapid settlement
could be reached.52

L. 0. Leonard, a member of the American Railway

Union, enthusiastically supported the strike in the first issue of the
Railway Review (formerly the Anaconda Review).53
A leading paper in the state, the Helena Independent, rushed to
endorse A.R.U. actions on June 26:
We hope that the American Railway Union will not let up in
its boycott of the Pullman Gar company until that corporation
will agree to pay decent wages to its porters . . .5^
A week later, after the conflict had paralysed most of the state's rail
system, the editor calmly pointed out:
The railway employees of the country as a whole are a body of
working men of whom any country might be proud. Ihey are tem
perate, industrious, intelligent, patriotic citizens, and it

5*^Almont Lindsey noted the ". « . (s] ensationalism, misrepresentation,
and other techniques of yellow journalism . . ." practiced by a variety
of leetding national publications including the Chicago Evening Post,
Chicago Journal, Chicago Herald. Chicago Tribune, Harper's Weekly,
Inter-Ocean, Nation, New York World, New York Times, and the Washington
Post— Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 308-17.
51Anaconda Standard, no. 301 (July 1, 1894), p. 1.
52sutte Miner, no. 179 (June 28, 1894), p. 4; Ibid., no. 182 (July 1,
1894), p. 4.

53Railway Review (Anaconda, Montana), vol. 1, no. 1 (July 19, 1894),
p. 1.
54Helena Independent, no. 127 (June 26, 1894), p. 4.
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is highly creditable to them that aunong so many hundred thou
sands, with all the excitement and confusion attendant upon a
big strike there atre so few cases of breach of the law or
destruction of property. Whatever differences of opinion the
American public may hold as to the merits or demerits of the
boycott, all will cheerfully bear tribute to the dignity and
orderliness with which it is being conducted.55
In Missoula, near the western border of the state, sentiments were
a bit more divided.

Ihe farmers of the surrounding atreas, including the

Grass Valley, French town, and the Bitter Root Valley, quickly met and
passed sympathetic resolutions offering substantial donations of beef,
potatoes, flour, and bacon, to the strikeirs .5^

As a result, the Weekly

Missouliam reported:
Ihe Garden City strikers are very much encouraged at the expres
sions of sympathy and offers of substantial assistance that are
being showered upon them from all sides and feel, in conse
quence, that they are in an excellent position to stay out and
make a long, winning fight.57
Other support came from the local American Federation of Labor, which
adopted a resolution extending moral sympathy of the A.R.Ü.58
However, labor support was not unanimous on the Rocky Mountain
Division of the Northern Pacific.

Although an estimated 40 percent of

the Northern Pacific's employees had willingly walked off their jobs and,
thereby, paralyzed the road, the remainder (including engineers, conduc
tors, brakemen, dispatchers, operators, and clerks) did not support the

55ibld., no. 134 (July 3, 1894), p. 4,
5 ^ e e k l v Missoulian. no. 27 (July 4, 1894), p. 3» Helena Independent,
no. 134 (July 2, 1894), p. 1,
57Weekly Missoulian. no. 28 (July 11, 1894), p. 1.

58ibid.
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strike,59

particularly resentful were the members of the Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, the Order of Railway Conductors, and the Brother
hood of Railway Trainmen, who passed resolutions expressing their
neutrality and lack of grievances against the Northern Pacific,^
The Missoulian remained fairly impartial in its reporting--a stance
which was criticized by a number of readers— although traces of hostility
occasionally appeared in its columns.

The paper defended the conduct of

'** • , striking employes [wh<^ entertain no desire to injure any of the
company's property . , ."^1

However, the Missoulian also nostalgically

bemoaned the loss
* , , of the good old days when railroads were an unknown
quantity and strikes and other labor disturbances considered
out of order and decidedly foreign to the then prevailing cus
tom in the northwest,^^
Generally, then, Montanans sympathized with the strikers, though
sympathies were divided over the strike itself.

Due, perhaps, to the

prevalent disgust with railroads and to the corresponding increase of
Populist sentiment, criticism of the strike was extremely muted.

In

fact, as previously noted, many groups, such as small farmers and a num
ber of labor organizations who faced potential economic disaster, were
among the most vocal supporters of the Pullman strike in the state,
Ihe strikers themselves, smarting from wage reductions and encour
aged by the Great Northern victory, were certainly quite militant—

59lbid., no. 27 (July 4, 1894), p. 1.
^ % elena Independent, no, 131 (June 30, 1894), p. Is Daily Tribune,
no. 329 (July 1, 1894), p. 1 .
Weekly Missoulian, no. 27 (July 4, 1894), p. 3 .
62lbid,, p, 4.
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perhaps too much so for the harried Eugene V. Debs who had tried, unsuc
cessfully, to limit the conflict to the cause of the Pullman workers and
the preservation of the American Railway Union.
However, it would be altogether too easy to overstate the strikers'
and the state's militancy or sentiments.
very moderate and restrained variety.

For that militancy was of a

For example, in virtually every

strike center in the state, the local chapter immediately organized its
own patrols to protect railroad property.

As a result, little or no

property was damaged or destroyed prior to the arrival of federal troops.
Further, American Railway Union spokesmen and their vocal supportais
defended the strike on the basis of American traditions.

Indeed, they

argued that unless organized labor's efforts proved successful, the tra
ditional American social and political fabric would be t o m by class
warfare— an event which they decried as vociferously as the most fright
ened of alarmists.
Something of this general mood could be seen in the communities'
Fourth of July celebrations— universally reported, in the best style of
western "boosterism,** as the best and most spectacular of the state's
history.

The Missoula Racing Association held a special two-day meet

(July 4-5)

• . a s there is not much else to do these days but to

attend races and watch the hand cars come in . . ."^3
That same Independence Day, Attorney-General Richard Olney defended
the introduction of federal troops into the conflict and pontificated:
"We have been brought to the ragged edge of anarchy, and it is time to
see whether the law is sufficiently strong to prevent this condition of

63Ibid.
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affairs • . ,*'64

Unaware of that "ragged edge," Missoula, like other

small communities throughout the state, simply enjoyed the holiday, while
every "suiarchist"
. . . not engaged in the arduous duty of grinding out the
American Railway union's daily paper, spent a pleasant day at
the race track, the picnic grounds, or in chasing the delusive
mountain trout • .
In the Butte/Anaconda area, where even greater community support
existed for the strike, the popular mood has hardly revolutionary.
Rather, the local American Railway Union chapter sent a voluntary, unpaid
crew to rescue a circus train stranded near Lima, Montana (the southern
most Montana community on the Montana Union r o a d ) I n

return, the

grateful Great Syndicate Shows and Paris Hippodrome held an A.R.U. bene
fit performance on July 7 in Butte,

The Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific

Railroad, which serviced the local mines and smelters, provided trans
portation at reduced rates so the area's residents could attend.

The

American Railway Union affair was a great success with over twelve
hundred spectators attending, including five hundred Butte, Anaconda,
and Pacific commuters.

^Quoted in Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 245, from the New York Times
(July 5, 1894), p. 2.
^^Weekly Missoulian, no, 28 (July 11, 1894), p, 5» 'The Helena
Independent, no. 137 (July 6, 1894), p. 5, reported similar activities
and celebrations in Helena, Glendive, and Bozeman.
66sutte Miner, no. 183 (July 2, 1894), p. 2.
Anaconda Standard, no. 307 (July 7, 1894), p. 3; Ibid., no. 308
(July 8, 1894), p. 3.
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CHAPTiîiR V

MOBILIZATION ON THE NOH'IHERN PACIFIC

Officials of the Northern Pacific road reacted quickly to the para
lyzing strike in Montana.

In an attempt to arouse public opinion against

the Americaji Railway Union, J. D. Finn, Superintendent of the Montana
Division, informed Sheriff Conrow of Livingston on July 1 that " . . .

the

strikers on the Northern Pacific railroad in certain localities are
destroying the property of the company . . . "

Finn then demanded that

Conrow protect the Northern Pacific's property in Park County from this
threat or assume liability for the anticipated damages.^

Finn's state

ments were probably designed for propaganda purposes, since there had
been little or no property destruction in that area.
Unwilling or unable to defeat the strikers in a private arena.
Northern Pacific officials, like the General Managers' Association of
Chicago, turned to the federal courts for support.

Finn and W. H.

Brimson. Superintendent of the Rocky Mountain Division, met in Helena on
July 2, where they consulted with the law firm of Cullen and Toole.^

The

^Anaconda Standard, vol. 5» no. 302 (July 2, 189^), p. 1. Finn's
charges of property destruction by the strikers were never proven— a fact
which tends to support the American Railway Union's allegation that the
Northern Pacific was engaging in a propaganda campaign to incite popular
sympathies against the strikers.
^Helena Independent, vol. 35, no. 133 (July 2, 1894), p. 1.
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following day they filed in the United States District Court for relief,
which was immediately granted by Judge Hiram Knowles.

In a decision

strikingly similar to those being delivered throughout the West, Knowles
discarded the mantle of judicial neutrality and held:
• • • that the said receivers be , . , authorized to discharge
all persons heretofore in their employ within the district of
Montana, irtio shall for the period of twenty four hours after
the publication of this order, refuse to perform the duties
for which they are respectively employed, and the said receiv
ers are further authorized and employed to take the places of
the persons so discharged upon such terms and conditions as to
the said receivers may seem meet and proper until the further
order of the court . • • and it is further ordered that all
persons be forbidden and prohibited from intimidating or
interfering in any manner with all persons who are now or who
may hereafter be employed by said receivers.3
Knowles also ordered United States Marshalls to arrest anyone who
attempted to interfere with railroad property or the running of trains
as well as anyone who advised or aided in such actions.

That same day,

Knowles issued a similar injunctions and instructions to cover the
Montana Union/Union Pacific road.^
The stricken railroads now possessed the legal tools to defeat the
strike, although they lacked the physical capability to fully utilize
those tools.

Pursuing a strategy of confrontation, the railroads refused

to listen to American Railway Union demands, while they intensified
efforts for even more governmental aid to defeat the insurgent strikers.
Both the judiciary and the military joined the cry for federal interven
tion in the West.
During the first days of July 1894, the United States District

3lbid.» no. 135 (July 4, 1894), p. 8,
4lbid.
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Court Judges of Montana and Idaho formally petitioned Attorney-General
Olney for federal troops,5

Arnold Paul has offered an explanation for

such judicial actions, which occurred throughout the country in the
summer of 1894.

During the early 1890s, a conservative-oriented Consti

tutional revolution replaced the traditional ideal of juristic neutiality
with the more dynamic concept of the "new judicialisra."^

The new

approach, in which the Pullman Strike marked a significant precedent,
produced an activist judiciary allied with the federal executive to
defend the rights of property.
To the conservative mind of the 1890*s, subject to growing fears
of unruly majorities and class conflict, the decision of the
American Railway Union to press ahead with a boycott, despite
all considerations of contractual and property rights and pub
lic necessity, smacked of the most irresponsible radicalism,
of anarchy and "communism."?
To meet this threat, which assumed " . . .

the aspects of class warfare,

an alarmed legal conservatism, unfavorable to the strike to begin with,
intervened in strength and broke the strike."8
To a significant extent. Judge Knowles was a staunch member of this
alarmed, property-conscious judiciary.

He had used the legal powers of

the federal government to support the railroads in the December 1893
wage dispute.9

in the summer of 1894, his judicial activism, or

^Richard Olney to Secretary of War (July 6, 1894), U.S., Navy and
Old Army Branch, Military Archives Division, Records of the Adjutant
General*s Office Pertaining to the Chicago Pullman Strike of 1894,
National Archives, Washington, D.G., Record Group 9^»
6paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law, pp. 1-3.
7Ibid., p. 136 .
Sibid., p. 132 .
9judge Knowles was probably influenced by Judge James G. Jenkins*
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partinsanship, increased when he delivered the July 3 injunctions.
The railroads in Montana, like those throughout the Trans-Mississippi
West, found a second and powerful ally in the United States Army.

On

July 3» 189^, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt reported that, despite
the federal court orders,
The situation on the Northern Pacific road west of Fargo
shows no signs of improvement. No trains running. Crews that
the rail-road authorities engage for services refuse to work
unless adequate protection is afforded them. The protection
of United States court an now offered does not in the laborers*
opinion secure them against danger.
I am not able to send out the paymaster for the bi-monthly
payments nor can I ship supplies to the posts on the line of
the Northern P a c i f i c .
Ihree days later, Merritt recommended to Secretary of War Daniel S.
LaMont that he be allowed to use troops to "remove the obstruction" on
the Northern Pacific road, since use of the operating Great Northern
system would result

. . in a derangement of the system of supplies

and Increased expense to the government . .
At a higher level, the railroads appealed to and found ready sup
port from Major General J. M. Scholfield, Commanding General of the
United States Army.

In a series of communications on July 6, James

(United States District Court at Milwaukee, Wisconsin), December 22,
1893, ruling on a Northern Pacific petition. Knowles* decision was
nearly identical to Jenkins* order, which authorized the Northern
Pacific receivers to reduce wages and enjoined employees to "absolutely
desist auid refrain" from harming or interfering "in any manner, by forcg,
threats, or otherwise" with whoever wanted to continue or begin work on
the Northern Pacific road; Ibid., pp. 116-18.
lOpelegram, Brigadier General Merritt to Adjutant General, United
States Army (July 3, 189^), Records of the Adjutant General's Office.
Telegram, Merritt to Secretary of War Daniel S. LaMont (July 6,
1894), Records of the Adjutant General's Office.
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McNaught, counsel for the Northern Pacific receivers, informed Schofield
and Secretary of War LaMont
• • • that if troops could be furnished to accompany mail
trains from St. Paul to Fort Keogh and Missoula . * • that road
could be opened . . . and the strike settled on the entire sys
tem within a week . . .12
McNaught further suggested that the government could dispense with the
normal legal procedures for employing federal troops, since

, the

conspiracy and lawlessness is so widespread and so far reaching atnd of
such a character as to render . . .

requisitions of Federal Courts and

State governors unnecessary . . ,'*13
The Cleveland Administration moved swiftly.

On the evening of

July 6— the same day that the Northern Pacific had petitioned for mili
tary intervention— Cleveland ordered Schofield to open the Northern
Pacific on the principal ground that it was a post route and a military
road.

Schofield's orders to Merritt and Brigadier General Otis,

Commander of the Department of the Columbia, contained the official
rationale for armed intention:
In view of the fact, as substantiated by communications received
from the Department of Justice, from your official reports and
from other reliable sources, that, by reason of unlawful
obstructions, communications or assemblages of persons, it has
become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to
enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceeding, the
laws of the United States in the states of North Dakota and
Montana along the line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, so as

^^James McNaught to Major General John M. Schofield (July 6, 1894),
Records of the Adjutant General's Office. Schofield apparently agreed
that the normal legal procedures necessary for the employment of federal
troops were inappropriate or "unnecessary," since he urged the introduc
tion of U.S. troops before the various states had a chance to prove their
ability to preserve order.
13Ibid.
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to secure to the United States the right guaranteed by Section
eleven of the Act Approved July 2, 1894, entitled "An Act
granting lands to aid in the construction of a railroad and
telegraph line from Lake Superior to Puget Sound on the Pacific
Gocist, by the Northern Route," to the use of said railroad as
a "post route and a military road, subject to the use of the
United States for postal, military, naval and all other govern
ment service," you are directed by the President to employ the
military force under your command, so as to give such protec
tion to said railroad as will prevent any unlawful and forcible
obstruction to the regular and orderly operation of said road,
"for postal, military, and naval and all other government ser
vices," within the limits of said States • . .^4
General Merritt, moving west from St. Paul, and General Otis, mov
ing east from Seattle, then conducted a gigantic pincer operation, which
encompassed the entire Northern Pacific route from Lake Superior to Ri^t
Sound,

The United States Department of Justice aided the military forces

by supplying U.S. Marshalls to arrest and hold the anticipated prisoners
for the actions of federal c o u r t s . S c h o f i e l d also encouraged the
departmentaJ. commanders to work very closely with Northern Pacific offi
cials throughout the operation.

On July 7» Merritt dispatched the first troop train from St. Paul.
The train, manned by two companies of regulars and carrying four work
crews, entered Montana at Glendive two days later (July 9) and stayed in

14Telegram, Schofield to Merritt (July 6, 1894), U.S., Navy and Old
Army Branch, Military Archives Division, Letters Sent by the Headquarters
of the Army (Main Series), 1828-1903» vol. 32 (Micro-copy 857, Roll 13)»
National Archives, Washington, D.G., Record Group 108; Schofield to
Brigadier General Otis (July 7, 1894), Ibid.
l^Telegram, Schofield to Merritt (July 7* 1894), Records of the
Adjutant General*s Office; Telegram, Schofield to Otis (July 7» 1894),
Letters Sent by the Headquarters of the Army.
1 ^Teiegraun, Schofield to McNaught (July 7, 1894), Records of the
Adjutant General*s Office.
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Billings that night.

Fifty troopers of the Tenth Cavalry from nearby

Port Custer had arrived to pacify the area on the previous day (July 8).^?
Commenting on their presence, the Billings Weekly Times observed:
Evidently they had been warned of danger at Billings, and the
peaceful inhabitants who were drawn there by curiosity were
surprised to see the warlike preparations which had been made
to resist the expected uprising of our citizens . . . « It
reminded one of what we read of a trainload of Cossacks enter
ing a Polish town, more than the progress of our own army
through a loyal territory.18
Local army commanders made similar warlike preparations throughout
the state on July 7-8 to the surprise of an amazed citizenry.

By the

evening of July 8, federal troops from nearby posts had occupied every
major rail center and bridge between Glendive and Helena although they
bypassed the Butte/Anaconda area where violent resistance was antici
pated. 1^

Farther west, troops also occupied Missoula and the surround

ing area.

1^Telegram, Merritt to Schofield (July 12, 189^), Ibid.
l% e e k l y Times (Billings, Montana), vol. 4, no. 13 (July 12, 1894),
p. 8.
19ihe A m y ' s apprehensions concerning the Butte/Anaconda area prob
ably stemmed in large measure from that area's enthusiastic support for
the Goxeyite activities of "General” William Hogan, who led a force of
over five hundred men, which seized a Northern Pacific train in Butte on
April 24, 1894. Thomas A. Clinch, "Coxey's A m y in Montana," Montana:
The Magazine of Western History, vol. 13» no. 4 (Autumn 19&3)» PP* 2-11,
passim; see also Eggert, Richard Olney, pp. 119-25»
The details of local troop movements may be found in (l) U.S., Con
gress, Senate, Annual Report of the Secretary of War for the Year of
1894, S. Sxec. Doc. 1, vol. 1, part 2, 5 3 M Gong., 3d. sess., 1894, pp.
120-30, 153-5?» and (2) the Records of United States A m y Commands,
National Archives, Washington, D.G., Record Group 98» Letters Sent File
(Fort Missoula, Montana), 188^t-94; and (3) Returns from United States
Military Posts, 1800-1916. Micro-copy 61?, National Archives, Washington,
B.C.: Roll Number 2?? (Fort Custer, Montana), Roll Number 573 (Fort
Keogh, Montana), and Roll Number 798 (Fort Assiniboine, Montana).
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During the occupation, an element of racism surfaced among the
strike's embittered supporters.

The Helena Independent reported that a

large number of Missoulians felt that, although the use of troops was
unnecessary, they " . . . would much prefer if any are used to guard
property, that they be white troops."^0
universal.

However, such attitudes were not

Indeed, the A.R.U. chapter in Livingston, widely regarded as

the state's most militant group, had formerly denounced the Chicago con
vention's decision to bar Blacks from the American Railway Union.^1
As the troops appeared, Cleveland issued a Presidential Proclamation
on July 9 explaining their presence.

Arguing that it had become ". . .

impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in North Dakota,
Montana, Idaho, Washington, Wyoming, Colorado, and California, and the
Territories of Utah and New Mexico," Cleveland introduced federal troops
• . . for the purpose of enforcing . . . the laws of the United
States, and protecting property belonging to the United States
or under its protection, and of preventing obstructions of the
United States Mails and of commerce . . . , of securing to the
United States the right guaranteed by law to the use of such
roads for postal, military, naval, and other governmental
22
service

Helena Independent, no. 140 (July 9* 1894), p. 1. A substantial
number of the federal troops used during the Pullman Strike were black
soldiers from the locally garrisoned 10th Cavalry, William H. Leckie,
% e Buffalo Soldiers: A Narrative of the Negro G a v ^ r y in the West
(Norman Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 19^7)» p« 254; a less
useful work is Major E. L. N, Glass, The History of the 10th Cavalry,
1866-1921 (Port Collins, Colorado: Old Army Press, 1921), pp. 28-30.
^1Anaconda Standard, no. 302 (July 2, 1894), p. 1.
22-rhe full text of the July 9 proclamation may be found in a vari
ety of sources including General John M. Schofield's autobiography,
Forty-Six Yeare in the Army (New York, New York: The Century Co., 1897),
pp. 511-12, and the July 10 issue of the Helena Independent. Most state
papers carried at least a synopsis of the order, explaining the presence
of federal troops in their communities.
Historians have debated the degree to which Cleveland was
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Cleveland further argued that all persons participating in

. . or in

any way connected . . •" with the now unlawful ’’obstruction" of the
affected railroads to return to their homes by 3:00 P.M., July 10.

Many departmental commanders, such as General Merritt of the Depart
ment of the Dakota, were conservative by temperament and receptive to
railroad cries for aid.

More significant, from the standpoint of

national policymaking, was General Schofield’s position.

As noted by

Harvey Wish, Schofield, as commamder of the Army, strongly favored

responsible for this policy. In his 1923 biography of Richard Olney,
Henry James argued that Cleveland, intensely interested in the Pullman
affair, formed a close alliance with Attorney-General Olney and dis
carded the states’ rights "shibboleth" of the Democratic Party in an
attempt to deal with the problems of an industrial, urban republic— i.e.,
to ensure a railroad victory over the American Railway Union (Henry
James, Richard Olney and His Public Service [Boston, Massachusetts :
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1923J» pp. 43-551» Horace Samuel Merrill’s biog
raphy of Cleveland extended James* thesis and argued that Cleveland was
the prime mover in the introduction of federal power to the dispute
(Horace Samuel Merrill, Bourbon Leader: Grover Cleveland and the
Democratic Party |^oston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown, & Co., 195?]»
pp. 193-^)•
Allan Revins sharply disagreed with James’ assertion, suggesting
that " . . . Cleveland wished to avoid any drastic Federal intervention.
But his impetuous and hot-tempered Attorney-General, Olney, who had been
closely identified with railroad interests, determined to smash the
strike . . ." (Revins, éd.. Letters of Grover Cleveland, pp. 242-4-3, and
Allan Revins, Grover Cleveland, A Study in Courage f^ew York, New York:
Dodd, Mead & Co., 1932], ppi 614— 28). In a recent biography of Olney,
Gerald Eggert agreed that Olney was the principal figure in the new fed
eral policy. However, Sggert argued that, although Olney viewed the
strike as illegal, he was extremely reluctant to use the Sherman AntiTrust Act to break the strike. Eggert also noted that Olney later
recented and came to favor compulsory arbitration, rather than federal
troops, as the proper means for settling major labor disputes (Eggert,
Richard Olney, pp. 134-62, passim).

23lbid.
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military intervention to stave off a railroad d e f e a t . F u r t h e r , as
revealed in a July 9 communication. General Schofield was the author of
the July 9 Proclamation, which was specifically designed to justify
intervention and a state of quasi-martial law in all affected states and
territories.
In his autobiography, Schofield revealed that his primary concern
had been a military one.

He dsimned the Great Northern Strike, the Coxey-

ites, and the Pullman Strike, together, blaming them for
Ihe lawless interruption of traffic on the Pacific roads [which]
had continued from the latter part of April till early in July
. . . in spite of all the efforts to enforce the laws . . . by
the ordinary proceedings . . .26
Arguing that the transcontinental railroads had been subsidized and built
”. . .

mainly as a military bond between the Atlantic States and the

Pacific States . . .

Schofield felt that there was no question as to

the legality of intervention in the name of national and military
security

Within three days (July 7-10), the federal executive branch, at the
urgent requests of the railway interests, had decided to extend the use
of federal, power into the hinterland of the American Northwest.

In

Montana, there had been no violence and little or no destruction of

2 ^ a r v e y Wish, "The Pullman Strike: A Study in Industrial Warfare,"
Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, vol. 32, no. 3
(September 1939)» P« 297*
25schofield to Cleveland (July 9# 189^), Letters Sent by the Head
quarters of the Army.
^^chofield, Forty-Six Years, p. 507.
27Ibid.. p. 509 .
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railroaxi property, but Army units mobilized, determined to preserve what
was perceived as the national security by opening the Northern Pacific
road and checking the expected deluge of anarchistic violence.
Surprisingly, the state government made no outcry.

Though there had

been no rioting and, therefore, no official req^uests for federal troops.
Governor Rickards refused to protest Cleveland's disregard of the tradi
tional state prerogative of preserving order within its own borders.
The Republican governor's silence contrasted sharply with the outcries
by the governors of Illinois, Colorado, Missouri, Oregon, and Idaho,
although those executives admittedly represented a minority sentiment
among state governors.

Most state executives, like Rickards, remained

non-commital, confining themselves to proclamations which warned their
citizens to preserve order and desist from any interference with rail
road traffic.28

^ÔLindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 261-63.
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OCCUPATION AND CONFRONTATION

Violence did erupt in the state after the introduction of federal
troops.

As the state government remained passive and federal troops,

injunctions, and proclamations, flooded the state, bridges were burned
and a major military-civilian confrontation occurred at Livingston, the
strike's center.

On July 9» while making their daily paper delivery to Missoula, the
Anaconda Standard's handcars discovered that the unoccupied Gold Creek
bridge had been burned.

An anonymous party or parties had also attempted

to fire the depot at Victor, Montana, located on a small, unoccupied
branch line servicing the Bitter Root Valley,^
The authorities never discovered the identity of the arsonists.
Certainly, it was never established that they were members of the Ameri
can Railway Union.

Possessing very little evidence, the area's papers,

unlike their national counterparts, declined to speculate on the person
or persons responsible for the arson.

Actually, such speculations would

have been extremely hazardous, since there was a large number of Populist
farmers, disgruntled Coxeyites, miners, and unemployed transients,
within the state who were hostile to the Northern Pacific.

Anaconda Standard, vol. 5, no. 310 (July 10, 1894), p. 1 .
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General Merritt characterized the strikers* attitudes fairly accu
rately, noting that there was "considerable feeling" in Montana, but
that he did not expect any violence.

However, he did allege, predictably

perhaps, that the strikers were responsible for the burning of the Gold
Greek bridge.^
Aside from that unproven suspicion, Merritt's general view was
valid.

Ihe strikers reacted swiftly, vehemently, and non-violently.

In

Livingston, despite Knowles* injunction, the approaching troop train,
and Cleveland's proclamation. Superintendent Finn was unable to enlist a
single mam to serve on the approaching St. Paul train.^

The strikers

then unanimously denounced the use of troops and deputy marshalls as
unnecessary, since they had never and would never " . . . destroy a
dollar's worth of company property . . ."^
Similarly, the Livingston Post denounced armed intervention as am
attempt to erect a "military despotism."

Ihe Post charged— correctly,

as later investigations would reveal--that the General Managers' Associ
ation and its imitator, the Northern Pacific, had obstructed the mails
by attaching Pullman cars to mail trains, thereby providing a legal basis
(albeit a flimsy one) for the "omnibus injunctions."

Calling on Governor

Rickards to protest Cleveland's actions, the Post charged that such inter
vention violated Article III, Section 31 of the new state's constitution,
which stated that

^Telegram, Brigadier General Wesley Merritt to Major General John M.
Schofield (July 9» 1894), Records of the Adjutant General's Office.
3Anaconda Standard, no. 310 (July 10, 1894), p. 1.

4nelena Independent, vol. 35» no. 141 (July 10, 1894), p. 1,
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No armed person or persons shall be brought into this state
for the preservation of the peace or the suppression of domes
tic violence, except upon the application of the legislative
assembly or of the governor when the legislative assembly cannot
be convened.5
American Railway Union members and their supporters registered simi
lar protests throughout the state.

Representative of statewide strike

opinion, the A.R.U. called a public mass meeting in the state capital on
the evening of July 9»

The speakers included A.R.U, leaders from butte,

Helena, and surrounding areas.

Addressing a large audience, which

included many non-union residents and "hundreds of ladies," Joseph Oker
of Marysville warned:

"Discontent could not be conquered by force.

Strikes were but a manifestation of discontent and unhappiness."

John H.

Husely of Helena compared the strike to a crusade, ", . . a battle for
supremacy between dollars and cents on one side and humanity on the
other,
Ihe principal speaker was J. H. Calderhead, leader of the powerful
Butte chapter of the American Railway Union,

Explaining and defending

the strike, Calderhead emphasized the moral issue involved rather than
wage demands.

Comparing the strike to the abolitionist movement of the

Civil War, he declared:

"When the condition of affairs at Pullman are

such that the men who worked there can no longer stand it, it is our du-ÿ
to take up the fight and carry it through,"

Arguing that the strike was

inaugurated out of a moral necessity, Calderhead, nevertheless, reiterated
that neither he nor the A.R.U. advocated violence of any sort.

Turning

to the immediate issue of federal intervention, he emotionally declared:

5Livingston Post, vol, 6, no. 14- (July 12, 1894), p. 2,
Helena Independent, no. I4l (July 10, 1894), p, 5»
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The strong arm of the government has been laid on us. A procla
mation has been issued prepatory to the declaration of martial
law. We believe this opportunity will be used by the plutocracy
to create a standing army and erect a military despotism.?
Ihe following day (July lO), a dramatic confrontation occurred in Living
ston between the civilian populace and the military forces aboard the
westbound St. Paul train.

One of the principals was Captain B. G,

Lockwood, who was in command of the troops accompanying the train.
Later, in sworn testimony defending his actions, Lockwood disclosed
his apprehensions of impending violence prior to the train’s arrival at
Livingston.

Though no serious incident had occurred during the first

day of operations, Lockwood and his troops had faced insults and threats
upon their arrival in Billings.

The next day (July 10), after leaving

Billings, Lockwood stated that he had

, frequently heard strikers

along the road call out that at Livingston [our] arms would be taken
Q
away and the trains destroyed . .
Lockwood’s second-in-command.
Captain J. G. Ord, corroborated Lockwood’s fears of impending conflict in
Livingston.9
General Superintendent Kimberly, who WSLS aboard the train, and Divi
sional Superintendent Finn, who met the train outside of town, helped
increase the commander’s apprehensions.

Kimberly and Finn warned Lock

wood **. . . that there would certainly be trouble . . ." in the town.

7 Ibid.
^Testimony of Captain B. C. Lockwood, "Investigation in the Case of
Captain Lockwood, Accused of Striking I. F. Toland with a sword at
Livingston, Montana, July 10, 189^," Records of the Adjutant General’s
Office, p. 182.
9Testimony of Captain J, C. Ord, Ibid., p. 188.
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and that he must take the necessary precautions
Expecting violence, Lockwood's command entered the town.

At the

depot they encountered a large crowd of six to seven hundred people,
including about 150 strikers, a large number of women and children, and
the principal elected officials of L i v i n g s t o n . M i s t a k i n g the crowd's
temper and anticipating a riot, Lockwood ordered his four companies,
which were

armed with loaded carbines amd bayonets, to form a cordon

around the

train and push the crowd back "with guns if necessary ."12

Lockwood then dismounted in a state of extreme agitation and
as noted by a large number of witnesses in sworn testimony.

He report

edly struck an old man in the stomach and rushed about frantically
trying to move the crowd farther back.
Obeying orders, one of the soldiers struck I. P. Toland, a Northern
Pacific foreman and a leading figure in the American Railway Union, in
the stomach with the butt of his rifle.

Toland later recountedî

"I told

him that I was in a public street, and Iwas in the neighborhood of
twenty feet from the track when I called him a son of a bitch . « ,"1^
Lockwood then rushed up and struck Toland in the head with the flat of
his sabre and threatened to ". . . run him through . . ." if he did not

lOTestimony of Lockwood, Ibid., pp. 182-83.
11 This figure is a r o u ^ estimate, since witnesses disagreed as to
the actual number. I. P. Toland suggested the six to seven hundred fig
ure, and it is quited here because most of the witnesses' estimates fell
within this general area.
12Testimony of Lockwood, Records of the Ad .jutant General's Office,
p. 183*
13lbid.
l'aiestimony of I. P. Toland, Ibid., p. 50.
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move farther back.

Pulling back his sword, Lockwood inadvertently-

struck a small boy (none of the individuals were seriously hurt, althou^
Toland required a number of stitches).^5
Lockwood argued:

Later, defending his actions,

"Seeing that if force was not used, bloodshed would

probably follow, I struck the ringleader . .
After Lockwood's assault, the crowd's temper became menacing and
ugly.

^7

Spying some non-union, imported workers on the other side of

the depot, the crowd surrounded them, hurling insults and threats.

Fear

ing for their lives, the workers drew revolvers, whereupon the crowd
charges.

All but one of the men broke through to the protection of a

detachment of soldiers, and the chief of police was able to protect the
remaining

man.

18

Having expected a riotous confrontation, Lockwood had overreacted
and nearly precipitated a riot.

In one of his more sensible actions,

Lockwood left the more sober minded Captain 0"Neill in charge of a
detachment and continued westward.

15Ibid.
lOTestimony of Lockwood, Ibid., p. 182.
17Frank S. Webster, a real estate and insurance agent in Livingston,
rented a hall to the A.R.U. and attended its meetings. Commenting on the
Lockwood incident, Webster testified: ". . . 1 know that the American
Railway Union had gotten their men stationed along the track, it cost
them $150 per day to guard the property here; they had men stationed at
the depot and at the bridge and I was told when the train came in it
would not meet with any violence at all, that they didn't intend to to
anything, but after that gentleman was hit— he happened to be one of the
leading men of the American Railway Union— that seemed to stir every
thing up • .
— Testimony of Frank S. Webster, Ibid., p. 100.
l % e l e n a Independent, no. 142 (July 11, 1894), p. 1.
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To this point, discussion of the Lockwood incident has been largely
confined to the military's view of the atmosphere in Livingston.

It

seems worthwhile, however, to consider the town's state of mind as per
ceived by its leaders and citizens.
Perhaps the most important aspect of the July 10 incident was the
townspeople's view of the day's events.

Most of the passengers and mili

tary personnel on the train viewed the crowd surrounding the depot as a
"threatening nob."

The majority of Livingston's residents, including

their principal elected officials, disagreed and substantiated I. P.
Toland's statement.

They felt that the crowd was actually rather cailm

and certainly peaceful, while Lockwood was nearly hysterical.
Livingston's mayor, Frank Beley, stated that Lockwood's attack on an
old man and Toland was entirely unprovoked.

Further, when the mayor

urged Lockwood to restrain himself, the agitated captain retorted that
he [^Mayor BeleyJ was a ". . . son of

a bitch . . . " and that "I jbockwoo^

am running this town . . ."19
Similarly, H. J. Miller,
of us anticipated any trouble

the Park County Attorney, testified:

"None

. . . " Since the crowd was not violent,

the local U.S. Marshall and his deputies, whose aid Lockwood refused,
were sufficient to handle any disturbance— federal troops were not needed
to preserve the civil order, which to that point was unbroken.

OQ

A. R. Joy, ex-mayor and a local attorney, also corroborated the fact
of the crowd's peaceful demeanor.

Observing that there had been no

l9Testimony of Frank Beley, "Lockwood Investigation," Records of the
Adjutant General's Office, pp. 162-68.
ZOpestimony of H. J. Miller, Ibid., pp. 2-11.
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violence or property destruction in the preceding two weeks, Joy noted
that only a small percentage of the assembled crowd were strikers anyway;
the rest were local businessmen, women, children, and other curious
21

spectators.

The testimony of Beley, Miller, and Joy represented the views of Ihe
Livingston community, which expressed its outrage at a mass meeting on
the night of July 10,

Over a thousand angry citizens filed into Living

ston's opera house to

listen to speeches by Joy, Miller, and ri. B. Kelley

(president of the local American Railway Union chapter).^2
At that meeting, nine leading citizens, including a district judge
and the county attorney, drafted a telegram to Governor Rickards and
Senator T. C. Power protesting Lockwood's actions,

Newspa.pers throughout

the state, joining in the general outcry, printed the telegram ini toto:
To-day a mail train in charge of soldiers, commanded by
Captain Lockwood, stopped here and many citizens through curi
osity, were at the station, and all were quiet and unarmed, Ihe
captain, without cause, struck an unoffending citizen on the
head with his sabre while standing on the public street, seri
ously wounding him, and the captain used vile and profane
language in the presence of ladies, and publicly insulted our
mayor. Our community feels greatly outraged.23

21 Testimony of A. R. Joy, Ibid,, pp. 16-1?,
22Relena Independent, no, 142 (July 11, 1894), p, 1, Although a
majority of Livingston's residents were outraged by Lockwood's actions, a
few supported him. Representing this dissenting view were George R,
M i l b u m (Judge, ?th District Court of Montana), G. L. Lockwood (taxider
mist), Dr, fi, Alton, and W. F. Sheard (gunsmith)— "Lockwood Investigation',*
Records of the Adjutant General's Office, pp. 240-63, passim,
23nelena Independent, no, 142 (July 11, 1894), p, 1; the telegram
was also enclosed in other communications: (1) Telegram, Governor John
Rickards to President Cleveland (July 11, 1894), Records of the Adjutant
General's Office, and (2) Telegram, Schofield to Brigadier General
Merritt (July 11, 1894), Letters Sent by the Headquarters of the Army,
The signatories were Frank Henry, H, J, Miller, John Ï. Smith, Allan R,
Joy, George Wright, L, M. Leply, J, P, King, James S, Thompson and
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Both Senator Power and Governor Rickards forwarded the telegram to
President Cleveland and General Schofield the next day,

Rickards

informed the President that
Emanating from prominent and reliable gentlemen, the telegram
is entitled to prompt and careful consideration. In the inter
ests of our citizens, as well as for the general good of the
public, I respectfully ask that the statements made in the
foregoing telegram be thoroughly investigated in such manner as
your judgment may direct.24
On July 11, Schofield ordered General Merritt to investigate the incident
and impose the appropriate disciplinary measures.25

In the days following the Lockwood incident, federal troops com
pleted the occupation of the Northern Pacific road.

While completing

the operation, troop trains faced no major obstructions by the civilian
populace, although demonstrations and hostility surfaced in most areas.
One such incident occurred in Missoula on July 11.
two hundred jeered the arriving eastbound train.

There, a crowd of
An unidentified person

hurled a brick at the conductor, whereupon Captain Loughborough, com
mander of the train, forced the crowd back with bayonets.

However,

there were no injuries on either side.26
Ihe same day, Rickards issued a proclamation designed to halt or
apprehend arsonists bent on stopping the troop trains.

The governor

offered a thousand dollar reward for information leading to the arrest

J. E. Swindlehurst.
24'relegram, Rickards to Cleveland (July 11, 1894), Records of the
Adjutant General*s Office.
23Telegram, Schofield to Merritt (July 11, 1894), Letters Sent by
the Headquarters of the Army.
26Anaconda Standard, no. 312 (July 12, 1894), p. 1.
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and conviction of anyone who burned or destroyed any " . . . valuable
structure belonging to any railroad company in this state, used, occu
pied, and necessary for the operation of such road . . ."27
The July 11 proclamation did not stop property destruction,

anon

ymous persons burned at least a dozen minor crossings and trestles
during the following week.
two miles west of Missoula.

On July 17, a passenger train was dynamited
Fortunately, no one was seriously injured

in the incident, which the American Railway Union emphatically condenred.^^
However, none of these events, all of which were criticized by local
A.R.U. chapters, seriously impaired the opening or operation of the
Northern Pacific,

ihe most serious incident was the July 9 burning of

the Gold Creek bridge, but it was quickly repaired and caused only a
slight delay to the westbound federal troops.
With the military forces patrolling the Northern Pacific line. Gen
eral Manager Kendrick sensed victory and offered Northern Pacific
employees their old positions if they applied before noon, July 15.
However, Kendrick warned that his road would not rehire everyone :
Men who have fomented disturbances, who have participated in

27The complete text of Rickard*s July 11, 1894, proclamation was
printed in the July 12, 1894, issue of the Helena Independent, p. 5»
^% e e k l y Missoulian, vol. 25» no. 29 (July 18, 1894), p. 4; Helena
Independent, no. 149 (July 18, 1894), p. 1, On August 11, 1894, six men
(Fred Nickols, Robert Steele, Charles Flynn, John Delaney, M. G. Walker,
and Cahill Wilson) were arrested in connection with the incident and
were charged with (1 ) tearing up railroad track, (2 ) assault with intent
to kill and murder, and (3) burglary. However, the court dismissed all
charges against all of the suspects (State of Montana v. Frederick
Nickols, et, al.. General Index Direct, vol. 1, nos. 211, 212, 213»
Missoula County Court House, Missoula, Montana.
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violence, or in destruction of railroad property, who have
counselled disobedience to the rules of this road, who have
interfered with and sought to prevent men from performing ser
vices, or in other words "sigitators" will not be acceptable.29
In a July 15 telegram to General Schofield, James McNaught, counsel for
the Northern Pacific, disclosed that the Northern Pacific's definition
of "agitator” included anyone who refused to renounce his membership in
the American Railway

Union,

30

The road anticipated that switchmen and

firemen would constitute the largest segment of such undesirables, but
McNaught felt the Northern Pacific ” . . .

could easily supply their

places with non-union labor”31 imported from eastern and midwestem
urban centers.
Faced with federal and state injunctions, imported non-union labor,
and the presence of federal troops and marshalls, many strikers accepted
defeat and the Northern Pacific's offer.

The more skilled workers, such

as engineers and conductors, began applying for their old positions all
along the line, and the Northern Pacific was able to announce the resump
tion of normal passenger and freight operations on July 17.32
Predictably, Livingston was a major exception— not one employee,
whether an A.R.U. member or not, applied before Kendrick's deadline.

29Telegram, General Manager J. W . Kendrick to Depot Manager (Helena,
Montana) W. W. Stuart (July 13» 189^), Helena Independent, no. 145 (July
14, 1894), p. 8 .
30Telegram, James McNaught, counsel for the Northern Pacific Rail
road, to Schofield (July 13, 1894), Records of the Adjutant General's
Office.
31Helena Independent, no. l48 (July 17, 1894), p. 8 ,
32Ibid.

33lbid., p. 1 .
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However, both the railroad and the military authorities anticipated only
minor difficulties on the Northern Pacific line.

On July 1?, McNaught

informed General Schofield that ", . . striking employes are daily and
rapidly sending in their applications," and that the Northern Pacific
would have little problem in replacing recalcitrant laborers with non
union men from St. Paul.^

On July 17, General Otis reported the line

clear from Portlamd to Missoula,^5

Similarly, General Merritt informed

national headquarters that the Northern Pacific was quiet throughout the
Dakota Department with only minor disturbances in Livings ton,

Merritt

also announcement his readiness to march on the Butte/Anaconda area
where he expected violence,36
By July 19, the Northern Pacific was indisputably victorious.

On

that date, even the militant Livingston chapter of the American Railway
Union bowed to the inevitable and declared the strike over,3?

Through

out Montana, public opinion, which had generally been sympathetic toward
the strikers, began to shift and demanded an immediate end to the con
flict.

Representative of this shift, Missoulians who had previously

supported the strike demanded an immediate end to labor disturbances; to
enforce their desires, the community appointed a large force of deputy
marshalls with instructions to arrest the ", , , first man who even

3^Telegram, McNaught to Schofield (July 17, 189^), Records of the
Adjutant General*s Office,
35Telegram, Brigadier General Otis to Schofield (July 17, 189^),
Ibid.
36Telegram, Assistant Adjutant General to Schofield (July 17, 189^),
Letters Sent by the Headquarters of the Army,
37Anaconda Standard, no, 320 (July 20, 1894), p, 1,
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yelled *scab* or made any public demonstration."38

With the Northern

Pacific strike over, federal troops began massing to disperse the remain
ing strikers on the Union Pacific’s branch line, the Montana Union.

38lbid. It is difficult to explain this shift in public sentiment,
since no firm evidence exists to account for the sudden change. Contin
uing economic hardships, engendered by the strike, and the apparent
railroad victory certainly played a role. Also, increasing property vio
lence, such as the Missoula incident, must have alarmed residents who
had previously supported the strikers; Stanley Buder (Pullman, p. 19^)
suggests a similar pattern of shifting popular sympathies in Chicago, by
noting that
. . the boycott and disorders cost the strikers the sup
port of many former sympathizers while diverting attention from the town
and multiplying the number of people elsewhere in need of aid." Finally,
some citizens had become reluctant to continue challenging the federal
authority when that authority appeared in the form of Army regulars who
had previously been venerated, especially during the state’s recent
frontier phase.
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CHAPTER VII

OCCUPATION OP rRüi MONTANA UNION
AND 'THÜ STRIKES AFTiüRMATH

Federal intervention on the Montana Union railroaid closely paral
leled the methods employed in crushing the strike on the Northern
Pacific.

J. S. Shropshire, attorney for the Union Pacific, refused to

negotiate with the strikers, and decided, instead, to appeal directly
to the United States District Court in Butte, Montana, for relief.
Judge Hiram Knowles immediately granted the Union Pacific receivers, as
he had the Northern Pacific management, the power to discharge and
replace striking employees.1
Employing tactics similar to those of the Northern Pacific, S. H.
H. Clarke of the Union Pacific, which was the parent line of the Montana
Union, requested military assistance.

On July 5» 1894, Clarke wired

General Schofield that his system was paralyzed west of Cheyenne, Wyo
ming, and that the *'[^rj eceivers are helpless except military assistance
be rendered . . ."2
General Schofield and Attorney-General Olney agreed to extend

^Helena Independent, vol. 35» no. 135 (July 4, 1894), p. 8 .
2xelegram, S. H. H. Clarke to Major General John M. Schofield
(July 5, 1894), Records of the Adjutant General's Office.
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military aid to beleagxiered Union Pacific system.

Olney suggested that

the legal rationale for Intervention was the same as that for the North
ern Pacific road.

Writing to Schofield on July ?, Olney declared:

The intent of the Union Pacific charter that the road of the
Compajiy thereby incorporated should be a post and military road
of the Union, it seems to me to be ets clear as in the case of
the Northern Pacific charter.3
Since the executive branch and the military agreed, Schofield con
fidentially informed Clarke that the necessary orders for " . . . protec
tion of the Union Pacific Railroad" would soon be issued.^

At midday,

July 7, Schofield wired instructions, identical to those telegraphed to
Generals Merritt and Otis, to Brigadier General Brooke, Commander of the
Department of the Platte.3
Within a week the Army opened the Union Pacific's main lines.
Union Pacific road was able to resume regular service on July It.6

The
On

July 15» General Brooke informed Schofield that
Reports from all points on Union Pacific report quiet and traf
fic resumed, except to Butte, Montana. I have not sent troops
to that point, but have placed them as far north as Dillion,
Montana.?
After the main lines were opened, the departmental commandera pre
pared to "mop up" the Montana Union line.

There, the principal strike

center and, thus, the primary target of the Army was Butte.

Because of

3'Telegram, Attorney-General Olney to Schofield (July 7, 1894), Ibid.
^Telegram, Schofield to Clarke (July 7» 1894), Ibid.
^Telegram, Schofield to Brigadier General Brooke (July 7» 1894),
Letters Sent by the Headquarters of the Army.
^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 248.
7Telegram, Brooke to Schofield (July 15» 1894), Records of the
Adjutant General's Office.
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the strong pro-labor sentiment in the Butte/Anaconda area. General
Merritt expected

. . t o encounter greater violence than has been met

up to this time," and he, therefore, wished to employ a large force to
o
pacify the area.
General Merritt was prepared to risk a possible strike on the Great
Northern by using that road to transport his troops.
der was unshaken, however, since he felt:

The zealous comman

"The union railroad element

is controlling on that road and to enforce order must be reduced to obe
dience or displaced by new men."9
On July 19, federal troops, directed by General Merritt from the
east and by General Brooke from the south, began their march on Butte,
Montana.

The Helena Independent reported the arrival of six companies

of regulars via the Great Northern, although the paper erroneously
speculated that their destination was C a l i f o r n i a . M e r r i t t ' s fears
(or hopes) that the Great Northern American Railway Union membership
would enter the conflict were not realized since the Great Falls chapter,
in a stormy meeting on July 17, had decided to haul the t r o o p s . I n
the south. Colonel Bates, commanding nearly six hundred troops, left
Cheyenne, Wyoming, on July I9 for Butte, Montana.
Meanwhile, striker sentiment remained high in the Butte/Anaconda

^Telegram, Merritt to Schofield (July 16, 189^)» Ibid.
9lbid.
l% e l e n a Independent, no. I50 (July 19, 1894), p. 8.
lllbid., p. 1.
Telegram, Brooke to Schofield (July 19, 1894), Recortfe of the
Adjutant General's Office.
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region.

11

On July 15» Anaconda held a “Grand Parade of Sympathy with

the American Railway Union,*' in which organized labor turned out in full
force to demonstrate its support for the strike.
J. H. Galderhead, observing the strike's collapse on the Northern
Pacific, condemned Governor Rickards for his inaction.

Foreseeing a

complete military occupation of the Montana Union, Oaulderhead argued
that Rickards could and should halt any federal intervention on that
road, since it was completely within the state's borders and, thus,
exempt from federal jurisdiction under Washington's interstate commerce
p o w e r s . R i c k a r d s , however, refused to forsake his non-committal posi
tion.
On July 18, two companies from the south occupied forty miles of
the Montana Union's tracks, extending as far north as Dillon, Montana—
seventy miles from Butte.

An unidentified party or parties dynamited

one small bridge and burned three others in retaliation.

Eschewing vio

lence, the American Railway Union appointed a special committee to
prevent such actions and promised that the troops would not face any
violence when they reached B u t t e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , the Union Pacific
supplemented Rickard's earlier offer by declaring that it would give a

l^part of the widespread sympathy in the area was due to the pres
ence of an estimated nine hundred American Railway Union members in the
Butte/Anaconda area (Railway Review [Anaconda, Montana], vol. 1, no. 1
[July 19, 189^, p. zT» However^ a large number of the labor emd far
mer organizations in the area supported the new union's actions.
^^Anaconda Standard, vol. 5» no. 316 (July 16, 1894), p. 3.
l^Butte Miner, vol. 31» no. 208 (July 18, 1894), p. 5*
^H e l e n a Independent, no. 150 (July 19» 1894), p. 1.
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one thousand dollar reward for information leading to the conviction of
anyone accused of destroying Union Pacific property.
In Butte, the union men of the Northern Pacific voted to return to
work on July 20, although they declared that the use of military force
was unnecessary.18

However, the Montana Union employees remained fizmi.

At a mass meeting that night. President Galderhead angrily denounced the
federal, government's policy, declaring;
. . . The greatest evil connected with railroad corporations
is the overwhelming influence they have in politics and legis
lation. . . . Troops are on the way to Butte to-night to
intimidate our citizens. The yards at Butte to-night are as
quiet as a cemetary. How long will this condition exist? The
only remedy is the government ownership of railroads.19
After Galderhead*s address, the membership unanimously passed a
resolution calling for government ownership of railroads, basing their
demand on the Preamble to the United States Constitution and expressing
their fear of an approaching police state.

20

The next morning (July 21, 1894), approximately 450 troops arrived
from Fort Assiniboine.

That afternoon, nearly six hundred regulars

entered Butte from the south.

The strikers kept their promise, and no

17Anaconda Standard, no. 321 (July 21, 1894), p. 1. Governor
Rickards had offered a one thousand dollar reward for information leading
to the arrest and conviction of anyone who burned or destroyed any ". . .
valuable structure belonging to any railroad company in this state, used,
occupied, and necessary for the operation of such road . . ." (Helena
Independent, no. 143 July 12, 1894 , p. 5)»
18july 20, 1894, officially marked the end of the Northern Pacific
strike. The Butte chapter's decision was in accord with that of the
Missoula and Bozeman chapters, which ailso voted to end the strike on
July 20 (Ibid.).

19 Ibid.
ZOlbid.; Butte Miner, no. 211 (July 21, 1894), p. 5»
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confrontation occurred as troops occupied the town.
of curious residents greeted the Army.

Only a smaJ.1 crowd

The principal excitement of the

day occurred when someone set off a string of firecrackers in the
Montana Union depot and momentarily startled the jittery regulars.
With the occupation of the last striker stronghold in Montana, the
Pullman Strike was effectively at an end in the state.

The Northern

Pacific line had been operating for several days, and on July 22, General
Brooke was able to report that after the "quiet and orderly" occupation
of Butte, " . . .

all the Union Pacific is now open for traffic."^2

A few futile protests and demonstrations erupted at various points
in the state, but organized resistance to the railroads had been effec
tively crushed.

On the Northern Pacific road, two hundred miners in

Gokedale, a small community near Livingston, pelted a non-union crew
with rotten eggs, rocks, and chunks of coal.

However, the next day

(July 22), a detachment of twelve regulars quickly dispersed the hostile
miners.23

On the Union Pacific road, the Silverbow Trades and Labor

Assembly protested the arrival of troops in Butte and demanded that the
Montana Congressional. Delegation (Senator T. C. Power and Representative
Charles S. Hartman) press for the immediate removal of the troops from
civilian centers in the state.2^

21Anaconda Standard, no. 322 (July 22, 189^), p. 1; Butte Miner, no.
212 (July 22, 1894), p. 5» Helena Independent, no. 153 (July 22, 1894),
p. 1.
22Telegram, Brooke to Schofield (July 22, 1894), Records of the
Adjutant General*s Office.

23Anaconda Standard, no. 324 (July 23, 1894), p. 1.
24'pelegram, Charles Lane (President of the Silverbow Trades and
Labor Assembly) and Patrick Meany (Secretary) to T. C. Power and
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However, the strike was over, and the Montana Union employees voted
to return to work on July 2 3 . In a bitter post mortem. President
Galderhead attributed the defeat to governmental interference, declaring
. . i t would be revolution to hold out against Uncle Sam . . . and we
must back down as gracefully as patriotic citizens can under the circum
stances . .

Galderhead specifically blamed the Cleveland Administra

tion for what he considered an ill-advised, rash violation of the United
States Constitution, and observed:
Not a link pin had been removed from the local yards; violence
was not even threatened. The civil authorities, always first
in matters of this kind, had not been called upon. One deputy
sheriff could have arrested every member of the American Rail
way Union without the least trouble.26

The victorious railroads quickly retaliated against the defeated
American Railway Union.

The General. Managers* Association and its allies

blacklisted thousands of former employees, while federal grand juries
issued indictments charging American Railway Union leaders with conspir
acy and contempt of court.
The Northern Pacific and the Union Pacific roads pursued similar
policies.

The Northern Pacific refused a large number of reemployment

applications in Livingston, Helena, and Missoula, while its St. Paul

Representative Charles S. Hartman (July 22, 1894), Records of the
Adjutant General*s Office.
Z^Anaconda Standard, no. 324 (July 24, 1894), p. 4; Butte Miner,
no. 114 (July 24, 1894), p. 5 .

^^Quoted in the Butte Miner, no. 213 (July 23, 1894), p. 5»
Z^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 279-81, 236-37*
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headquaxters officially blacklisted four hundred former

employees.

28

Superintendent Brimson, announcing the official Northern Pacific posi
tion, warned the "agitators," a term which included employees who
refused to renounce their American Railway Union affiliation, and "dyna
miters," as determined by company dossiers, would not be rehired, while
the rehiring of "acceptable" employees would depend on the "needs of the
railroad."

Because of this policy, over eight hundred former employees

did not receive their former positions.29

Similarly, the Union Pacific

discharged two thousand employees, including many on the Montana Union
road.30
Union Pacific officials also filed complaints against American
Railway Union leaders on the Montana Union line.

J. S. Shropshire,

Union Pacific attorney in Butte, petitioned the U.S. District Court to
issue warrants for eleven American Railway Union leaders in Lima,
Montana, the southernmost terminal of the Montana Union line,

the com

plaint alleged that they
. . . were the leaders among others in committing the Acts
herein complained of, and were guilty of contempt of court in
that they did on or about June 30 by acts, orders, commands and
threats interfere with trains and engines . . . by removing the
spikes, plates and braces of the rails of the track . . . and
by menaces and threats preventing the receivers from repairing
the dame and by acts aforesaid and by threats and other acts of
intimidation prevented and delayed the running of trains and
prevented employes who were willing to continue working from
doing so, . . . thus depriving the receivers from the right

28Anaconda Standard, no. 323 (July 22, 1894), p. 1 ; Livingston Post,
vol. 6, no. 19 (August 16, 1894), p. 1 and no. 20 (August 23, 1894),
pp. 1-2.
29Helena Independent, no. 152 (July 21, 1894), p. 1.
30Bozeman Chronicle, vol. 12, no. 29 (August 23, 1894), p. 4;
Livingston Post, no. 20 (August 23, 1894), p. 2.
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and privilege of the use and enjoyment of property . . .31
Judge Knowles duly issued the warrants, and federal troops arrested
the eleven men on July 23 and 24, although the authorities had some
difficulty apprehending a few individuals who had. been fishing and camp
ing for several

d ays,

32

Speaking for the "Lima 11," Hugh Barton argued

that the charges were "trumped up,"

Barton maintained that the accused

men had specifically instructed strikers to keep away from railroad
property, while a bridge foreman had inspected the tracks the day before
troops arrived and found no property destruction along the Montana Union
tracks
In Butte more arrests followed.

On July 25» U, S. Deputy Marshalls

arrested Fred Walker, L. Û. Garvin, George Boomer, J . L. McDonald,
Patrick Meany, C. R. Allen, W. B . Dye, and G, B. Jolly, on comtempt
charges for the violation of Judge Knowles* July 2? injunction.34

On

July 27, the the president of the local American Railway Union chapter,
J. H. Galderhead, who faced similar charges, voluntarily surrendered to
federal authorities,35
The trial of the Montana Union strikers began September 6, 1894,

Quoted in the Anaconda Standard, no, 325 (July 25» 1894), p, 4,
32Ibid., no, 326 (July 24, 1894), p, 4, The eleven men were
Michael Cavanaugh, P. H. Patterson, S. J. Parry, William Davis, B. W.
Wilson, H. Barton, A. 0. Willour, J . D. Masters, A. Christianson, S. 0.
Height, and B. W. Downy (Livingston Post, no, 20 ^August 23» 1894J, p,

2

#

33Anaconda Standazd, no, 326 (July 26, 1894), p. 4,

34 Ibid.; Butte Miner, no, 316 (July 26, 1894), p. 5#
35weekly Missoulian, vol. 25, no. 31 (August 1, 1894), p, 1,
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in Butte, Montana.

Most of the men were released because of lack of evi

dence, a finding which was facilitated by Knowles* ruling that the men
could not be found in contempt of court for calling anyone a "scab" or
inducing others by peaceful methods to quit work.3&
However, Judge Knowles found Galderhead, Walker, Garvin, Dye,
Boomer, and Barton guilty of contempt of court and sentenced them to
thirty days in the county jail and fined them one hundred dollars per
man.

The residents of Butte were surprised by the relative harshness of

Knowles* verdict, since it was widely assumed they would only be fined
and reprimanded.
Released on October 24, 1894, the strikers, considered revolution
ary anarchists or worse by the military authorities. Issued a very non
revolutionary statement.

Declaring " . . .

obedience to the law is the

duty of a citizen . . . "

J. H. Galderhead, speaking for his fellow

prisoners, thanked the jailors for their courtesy and expressed the hope
that " . . .

they may always find the pathway of life pleasant.

Although a number of American Railway Union leaders, considered
innocent of any wrongdoing by many of their peers, were subjected to
fines and limited terms of imprisonment. Captain Lockwood, whose rash
actions nearly precipitated a riot, was found innocent by the military
authorities.

Responding to local and state pressures, on July 11, 1894,

Major General. Schofield ordered General Merritt to investigate the

36Anaconda Standard, vol. 6, no. 4 (September 14, 1894), p. 5»
Ibid., n o . 1 1 (September 14, 1894), p. 5»
Ibid., no. 22 (September 25* 1894), p. 5*
38ibid., no. 52 (October 25# 1894), p. 8.
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July 10 incident in Livingston.

On July 13» 1894, Merritt appointed

Captain G, P. Glenn as Acting Judge Advocate for the Lockwood investi
gation.39
In Montana, journalistic emotions ran high as most papers demanded
that Lockwood be punished for striking I. P. Toland and the small child.
The Bozeman Avant-Courler and other small eastern Montana papers,
including the Yellowstone Journal, the Stock Grower*s Journal, the
Billings Gazette, and the Stillwater Bulletin, took the minority view
and defended Lockwood's actions as justifiable in the face of hostile
workers who allegedly leaned " . . . dangerously towards socialism and
insurrectionary expedients."

Relying on the train passengers' testimony

and viewing Lockwood as a force for "law and order," the papers argued
that only through such actions and the defense of those actions in the
face of contrary popular sentiment could " . . .

brains and loyalty and

patriotism— in a word, Americanism— . . . triumph over fanaticism, law
lessness and brute force ."^0
Captain Glenn's report agreed with this alarmed minority sentiment.
In the investigation, Glenn recorded testimony from ninety-eight wit
nesses, including train passengers, officers, enlisted men, and residents
of Livingston.

Generally, the soldiers and passengers, who had been

warned of imminent riots at Livingston, characterized the crowd surround
ing the depot as a "threatening mob" and, therefore, defended Lockwood's

39Communication by Assistant Adjutant General for Brigadier General
Merritt (July 13» 1894), Records of the Adjutant General's Office.
^^Avant-Gourier (Bozeman, Montana), vol. 23» no. 36 (July 28, 1894),
p p .

1 - 2 .
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conduct.
However, a majority of the town's residents, including disinter
ested citizens, testified that the crowd was composed of curiosity
seekers with only a minority of strikers present.

Further, the American

Railway Union, aJLthough extremely militant, actively condemned

1 forms

of violence to persons or property— an argument which was substantiated
by the fact that neither persons nor property had been harmed prior to
the arrival of military forces.

So, Livingston's residents felt that

Lockwood's actions were, at best, rash, unjustified, and ill-advised.^^
Nevertheless, Captain Glenn recommended that Lockwood not be courtmartialed.

His superior. General Merritt heartily concurred.

On

August 6, 1894, Merritt recommended to General Schofield that Lockwood
"...

did his duty well under the circumstances . . ."

exonerated.

and should be

Merritt acknowledged that the investigating officer was

biased and that much of the testimony was highly prejudiced in favor of
Lockwood— indeed, James McNaught and T. R. Selmes, counsel for the
Northern Pacific Railroad, had and were continuing to supply a number of
affidavits on their own initiative to

G

l

e

n

n

However, Merritt felt

that
. . . the very general approval by disinterested persons includ
ing ex-Sena tor McMillaji (of Minnesota) . . . coupled with the
evidence of Messrs. Kimberly and Finn and the army officers
present . . . exonerated Captain Lockwood. . . from the charges

^1"Investigation in the Case of Captain Lockwood Accused of Strik
ing I. F. Toland," Records of the Adjutant General's Office, pp. 2^9-57»
396-401, passim.
41 T. R. Selmes to Captain C, F, Glenn (August 31# 1894), Ibid.
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made against him . , ,^3
Merritt revealed his attitudes even more clearly in his annual
report to the Secretary of War.

In that document, Merritt condemned

what he considered the "vicious" and "lawless" elements which partici
pated in the Pullman Strike,

The commander of the Dakota Department

then observed that, taken together the Goxeyite movement and the Pullman
Strike illustrated

, . the necessity of tactics for maneuver of

machine guns
Major General Schofield, whose conservative temper has alresidy been
noted, concurred with Merritt on October 5» 1895, and made the appropri
ate recommendations to Secretary of War Daniel LaMont.^3

On October 19»

the War Department notified Governor Rickards that it had found Captain
Lockwood’s actions "entirely justifiable,"

The decision, labelled a

"whitewash" by the Livingston Post,^^ held that
, , . the circumstances which
against Captain Lockwood were
against the Government of the
of the national authority . ,

gave rise to the accusations
no less than an insurrection
United States and open defiance
,^7

In an incredible passage, the War Department further argued that

^3Telegram, Merritt to Schofield (August 6, 1894), Ibid,
^"Report of Brigadier General Wesley Merritt," Annual Report of
the Secretary of War, pp. 125-28; also reproduced in the Anaconda
Standard, no. 4-7 (October 20, 1894), p. 1.
^^Letter, Schofield to Secretary of War Daniel LaMont (October 5»
1894), Records of the Adjutant General’s Office,

46Livingston Post, no, 30 (November 1, 1894), p, 3*
4?Telegram, John B. Doe (Acting Secretary of War) to Governor
Rickards (October 19, 1894), Records of the Adjutant General’s Office.
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there were no innocent bystanders, since by their very presence, other
wise merely curious bystanders supported and aided the "mob" and could
only blame themselves for subsequent injuries.
. . . It is shown that even idle bystanders, having no inten
tion to take part in mob violence, did, nevertheless, by their
presence with the lawless mob, give countenance and encourage
ment to the insurrection. If the citizens suffered some
violence at the hands of the troops because the latter could
not discriminate between the innocent and the guilty, it would
seem that the citizens are themselves to blame for their mis
fortune, . . .^8

The Pullman Strike had been smashed.

The federal courts, the

national executive, and the military, had forsaken their traditionally
neutral roles in the name of what Arnold Paul has called the "New
Judicialism."

A new, or at least a vastly strengthened, alliance was

formed between large railroad interests and the federal government.

As

Ray Ginger has suggested, the significant precedent established a new,
active social policy.^9

Constitutional order was to be viewed as depen

dent on the maintenance of corporate power and stability as opposed to
militant organized labor.

The federal government was prepared to over

ride traditional state prerogatives and employ its full power through
the courts and armed forces to protect that new order from the antici
pated and widely feared threat of class conflict and confrontation.
Montana, like other middle and far western states, was an arena for
the inauguration of this new policy.

The optimism of the strike's early

days gave way to amazement and bewilderment as federal courts enjoined

4 8lbid.
^9Ray Ginger, "The Pullman Boycott Reconsidered," Explorations in
Entrepraieural History, First Series, vol. 5» no. 4 (May 15, 1953)»
p. 236 .
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strike activity and federal troops began arriving to enforce the courts*
decision.

A few unidentified individuals retaliated by venting their

anger in scattered acts of violence.

However, confronted by blacklists

and indictments, most strikers sank into a state of cynical despair.
Summarizing the strike and its aftermath, one Montanan expressed the
attitude of many residentss
As *tis the fashion we would like
To have our say about the strike;
Each one it seems has something planned
To thwart these evils of our land.
Each strike that's made, to some extent.
Has always had a precedent;
They cause much loss suid some must bend.
And but little’s gained in the end.
Some say go to the ballot box.
You’d as well get the chicken-pox.
For don’t we all know? aye full well.
Elections now are grumbling hells;
What would be our plan, do you ask?
Here’s our pen, we give up the task.
The corporations of all lands
Have men and laws well in their hands;
What! you say " ’tis very funny?"
Not to me, they have the money.
Verdant Slim
Darby, Montana
August 22, 189^50

3Qpitter Root Times (Hamilton, Montana), vol. 6, no. 21 (August 24,
1894), p. 2. The name "Verdant Slim" is undoubtedly a pseudonym, but
the available sources do not shed light on the real identity of the
author.
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CHAP m a VIII
SOI'm COMPARISONS AND OBSERVATIONS

Montana and other western states were somewhat of an anoraaily in
their reaction to the Pullman Strike.

Nationally, the majority of the

public supported Cleveland's actions.

Although many individuals were

sympathetic to the Pullman workers* struggle, that sentiment became
overshadowed by unfounded fears of anarchy and violence, which were
encoureiged by irresponsible journalists who emphasized and exaggerated
the more violent aspects of the strike.

Business and professional

organizations exhibited their opposition to the strike by supporting the
federal government's innovative policy, while agricultural interests
remained fairly neutral.^
A majority in the United States Congress also supported the govern
ment's policy during the Pullman Strike.

Both houses registered

overwhelming support for Attorney-General Olney's tactics.

One indication

of Congressional sentiment lay in that body's negative reaction to a
proposal by Senator James Kyle of South Dakota.

Kyle proposed that the

Justice Department be compelled to modify and limit its definition of
what constituted a mail train.

More significaincant perhaps, Kyle

proposed that legal action should be allowed only when strikers

^Lindsey, Pullman Strike, p. 321.
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interfered with that part of a train which was essential to the transpor
tation of mails . .

The detachment of the Pullman cars, which were

clearly not essential for the operation of trains or the transportation
of mails, would not, therefore, constitute a federal offense or a basis
for federal intervention.%
3
The American Railway Union, including the local chapters in Montana,
supported the Kyle proposal.

However, Senator Cushman K. Davis (Repub

lican from Minnesota) vocalized the attitudes and fears of most of the
Senate and the nation when he opposed the measure.

To a nation alarmed

by ” . . . financial panic, economic depression, and profound labor
unrest . .

and the example of the assassination of President C a m o t

of France, Davis* arguments for a return to "law and order" seemed plau
sible and necessary.^

The senator’s "hard line" opposition to the Kyle

resolution quickly transformed him into a national hero.

Over ninety

newspapers from thirty-three states begun viewing Davis as a presiden
tial prospect in the I 896 election.^
The national legislature's mood was expressed even more clearly in
mid-July 1894, when both the Senate and the House passed resolutions
which fully endorsed Cleveland's actions.

In the Senate, there was

little opposition to the resolution, which was passed on July 11, 1694,

^Kent Kreuter and Gretchen Kreuter, "The Lure of Law and Order:
Cushman K. Davis and the Pullman Strike," Mid-America, An Historical
Review, vol. 51» no. 3 (July 1969)» p« 195»

3fiutte Miner, vol. 31» no. 184 (July 3» 1894), p. 5»
k r e u t e r and Kreuter, "Lure of Law and Order," p. 197*

3 Ibid., p. 201.
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by a combination of northern auad southern senators.&
Five days later, the House passed a similar resolution.

There too.

Southern delegates, such as Representative Catchings of Mississippi,^
supported the Cleveland Administration's innovative policy which over
rode traditional state prerogatives.

Advocating the minority view.

Representative Bland of Missouri opposed the resolution:
. . . I believe in local State Government, and the whole arm
of the State authority should be used in suppressing violence
before the Federal Government should interfere, except to pro
tect its own property and its mails.
I am aware, Mr. Speaker, that throughout this country,
even in States where there was no violence, and where if vio
lence occurred at all, the State authorities were ready and
able to deal with it without auiy instructions sent out by the
Attorney-General. Ihe whole country was flooded with deputy
marshals; sheriffs were arrested. State authority was over
thrown and the strong arm of the Federal Government took pos
session of matters properly belonging to the States . . .8

Public sympathies in the western half of the country contracted
sharply with the attitudes of the federal government and the nation in
general.

Within this laxge region, Montanans* attitudes, like those of

other states* citizens, were generally sympathetic to the strikers and,
in many cases, to the strike itself.

However, ailthough an aura of mili

tancy enveloped the state, only sporadic, scattered acts of property
destruction occurred in Montana.

Events in the state contracted sharply

with the large scade rioting and violence in the Midwest at Chicago,

8u.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 53rd Cong., 2d sess,, 1894,
vol. 26 , part 7 , pp. 7282 ,
“^Ibid., part 8 , p. 7544,
Gfbid.
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Illinois, and at Heuiunond, Indiana; in the Rocky Mountain West at Trini
dad, Colorado, and at Raton, New Mexico; and in the Far West at
Sacramento, San Francisco, and Oakland, California.9
According to popular stereotypes, which portray the West as a
"Cradle of B a r b a r i s m , ^

one would expect Montanans* reaction to the

Pullman Strike to be one of widespread lawlessness and violence.

Popu

lar sympathy for the Coimonwealers * hijacking of a Northern Pacific
train at Butte during the previous spring would tend to reinforce such
expectations.
man Strike.

As previously noted, violence did erupt during the Pull
However, there were relatively few such incidents, and they

were restricted, aside from one attempt to dynamite a passenger train
near Missoula, to scattered acts of property destruction rather than the
large scale rioting in the Strike’s center in Chicago.
At first glance, it is difficult to account for Montana’s militant,
non-violent response to the strike, since the sequence of events in the
state paralleled that of urban Chicago.

In both places, railway workers,

suffering from real or anticipated wage reductions, sympathized with the
Pullman employees, whose plight symbolized their own predicament in a
drajnatic fashion.
Once the strike had begun, it was immediately successful.

The Gen-

eraJL Managers* Association, including the Union Pacific and the Northern
Pacific were suddenly confronted by the probability of a reenactment of

9lindsey, Pullman Strike, pp. 2^6-52.
^®Ray Allen Billington, America’s Frontier Heritage (Hinsdale,
Illinois: Dryden Press, I966 ), pp. 69-95» passim. Blllington argued
that the West*s "frontier-process" created neither ". . . a patentoffice model of the East nor a land sunk in barbarism . . ."
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the Great Northern's defeat and by a corresponding increase in the Amer
ican Railway Union's power.

Anxious to avoid both developments, the

General. Managers' Association, the member Union Pacific line, and the
imitative Northern Pacific petitioned both the federal courts and the
Cleveland Administration for aid to smash the strike and, hopefully, the
American Railway Union.

Both the courts and the federal executive

branch quickly granted the railroads' request by flooding the country
with injunctions and by employing most of the Army stationed in the
western half of the United States.
Ihe combination of corporate, judicial, Presidential, and military
power quickly defeated the strike in Chicago and in Montana, which was
one of the areas where Debs had optimistically hoped to make a lastditch effort against the railroads.

The railroads' victory was followed

by punitive measures against union leaders.

In Chicago, a federal grand

jury indicted Debs (President of the American Railway Union), George W.
Howard (Vice President), Sylvester Keliher (Secretary), and Lewis W.
Rogers (Editor of the A.R.U.'s paper, the Railway Times), and charged
them with c o n s p i r a c y S i m i l a r l y , in Montana J. H. Galderhead, Presi
dent of the Butte American Railway Union chapter, et al., were indicted.
Despite the similarities between the Chicago and Montana experi
ences during the strike, sharp differences did exist.

A major distinc

tion was the fact that Montanans reacted in a relatively non-violent
fashion.

A second difference, which largely accounted for that non

violence, was the widespread public support (including independent
publications as well as the state's major newspapers, which were

llldndsey, Pullman Strike, p. 278.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88
controlled by large mining interests) for the strikers in Montana.
One factor explaining that support was the strong current of antirailroad sentiment which had evolved prior to the Pullman Strike,
Thomaa A. Clinch suggests that the anti-railroad sentiment in Montana
originated primarily in a recurrent dispute over the Northern Pacific's
land grant by which that road claimed over fourteen million acres in the
state.

The company began filing its claims in 1884-, and by 188? the

road had selected over two million acres which included a sizeable
amount of western Montana's mineral lands, which the Northern Pacific
argued were atgricultural in character.

1?

To enforce its claims, the Northern Pacific sought injunctions to
eject miners from the company's alleged property, and a series of court
battles ensued between mine owners and the railroad.
tle was not limited to those parties.

However, the bat

Western Montanans, regardless of

political affiliation, protested the Northern Pacific's attempt to con
trol the state's mining operations.

Indeed, Clinch argued:

The Northern Pacific became the bete noire of western Montanans
of all walks of life and of all political faiths because it
threatened the basis of their principal industry— mining,^3
Populists in the state also protested the Northern Pacific move.
Concentrated in western Montana, this organization was heavily dependent
on trade unions in the mining region around Butte and Helena,

deflect-

ting this concern, the Populists* state platform of 1892 demanded that

^^Thomas A. Clinch, "The Northern Pacific and Montana's Mineral
Lands," Michael P. Malone and Richard B. Boeder, eds,, Montana's Past:
Selected Essays (Missoula, Montana: University of Montana Publications
in History, 1973), P* 273» Reprinted from the Pacific Historical Review
vol. 3^, no, 3 (August 1965), pp. 323-33 .
13lbid., p. 283
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the Northern Pacific forfeit

. its land grant for failure to meet

the deadline for completion."!^
Given this widespread popular hostility toward the Northern
Pacific, it is hardly surprising to discover a corresponding support for
the American Railway Union by the state's residents during the Pullman
Strike of 189^.

Other factors, such as anticipated greater retail sales

from the increased spending power of railway workers and a genuine sym
pathy for the Pullman and railroad workers, certainly played a role in
shaping public opinion.

However, the principal economic factor in gen

erating support for the strike remained a deep, uncompromising hostility
to the Northern Pacific's attempt to control the state's mineral lands

A corollary to this economic factor was a social/psychological
element suggested in national terms by Robert Weibe.

In his book. The

Search for Order, Weibe argued:
The great casualty of America's turmoil late in the century
was the island community. Although a majority of Americans
would still reside in relatively small, personal centers for
several decades more, the society that had been premised upon
the community's effective sovereignty, upon its capacity to
manage affairs within its boundaries, no longer functioned . . .
In a manner that eludes precise explanation, countless citizens
in towns and cities across the land sensed that something

l4ibid.
! ^Although anti-Nor t h e m Pacific attitudes pervaded the entire
state, those sentiments were relatively muted in eastern Montana, where
cattlemen and sheepmen, who constituted the economic batse in that area,
enjoyed favorable treatment, vis-à-vis rate schedules. Further, although
during the 1893 depression "Western Montana, heartland of the mining
industry, suffered to an extreme degree, Eastern Montana, primarily an
agricultural region, suffered . . . but not with the same intensity,
since the demand for beef and grain did not lessen as sharply as that
for silver." (Clinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana, pp.
13 and 103).
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fundamental was happening to their lives, something they had
not willed aind did not want, and they responded by striking out
at whatever enemies their view of the world allowed them to
see. They fought, in other words, to preserve the society that
had given their lives meaning. But it had already slipped
beyond their grasp.
Though subject to many of the same fears held by individuals throughout
the country, Montanans in 189^ still lived in small, relatively isolated
communities.

This social environment could still provide individuals

with a sense of identity and well-being within the community.

However,

residents were aware of the gigantic changes sweeping the nation and the
world— events which seemed, to varying degrees, to undermine their own
values and beliefs.

A more immediate threat and, consequently, a more

tangible enemy were the railroads, including the Northern Pacific, whose
policies were determined in distant cities and over which the community
had little or no leverage.

Seen from this perspective, the widespread

hostility toward the Northern Pacific can be viewed as ilie venting of
repressed apprehensions and frustrations by a large number of the state's
residents.
Similarly, popular support for (and opposition to) the Pullman
Strike was a continuation of the defense of idie community against pow
erful, impersonal forces, which from the community's standpoint, threat
ened to destroy that institution and its attendant value structure.
This vague, shadowy, and yet powerful, sentiment surely combined with a
more personal concern for individual members of the community— i.e., the
strikers.

The state's newspapers in every town on the Northern Pacific

and the Union Pacific lines reflected this sentiment by emphasizing the

York:

l^Robert H. Weibe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, New
Hill & Wang, 196?), p. 44.
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strikers* commitment to the town's interests and welfare.
Reinforcing community sentiment as well as anti-railroad and antiCleveland prejudices was the growing Populist movement within the state.
Formed in January 1892, the Montana Populist Party attracted trade
unionists, farmers, and liberal reformers.

With this broad, popular

base. Populists made "dramatic gains" in the 189^ state legislative
e l e c t i o n s . F u s i n g with the Democratic Party in I 896, the Populist
movement reached its peak in the I 896 elections as voters in all but two
of the state's counties overwhelmingly supported William Jennings Bryan
for President; in state contests. Populists elected R. B u m s Smith as
governor, as well as an "overwhelmingly fusionist" House.
The Pullman Strike occurred in the midst of this growing Populist
sentiment, which contributed to community support for the strikers.
Because of its rather unique orientation, Montana Populism directly
reinforced community attitudes.
which was " . . .
1 896 . . ,"19

That unique orientation was silver,

the great unifying force from I 889 to at least

Since silver mining formed the primary base of Montana's

economy, its defense attracted supporters from all classes, occupations,
and political persuasions.
principles, " . . .

Although farmers did subscribe to Populist

the typical Populist in Montana, in centers of party

strength such as Butte, Anaconda, Helena, and Great Falls, was an urban

ITciinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana, pp. 171-72.
l^The national victor, William McKinley, captured only two counties
(Dawson and Custer), located in eastern Montana, by very narrow margins
(Ibid., p. 153).
l^Ibid., p. 20,
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trade unionst or middle-class advocate of reform."20
Ihis cross section of the state's residents expressed itself, ats
previously noted, in the pervasive, unified hostility toward railroads,
and especially toward the Northern Pacific which seemed to directly
threaten the very basis of the new movement— silver.

More immediately,

this unifying, community force— i.e., silverite Populism— expressed
itself in the state's sympathy for Goxeyism^l and its support of the
Pullman strikers.
J. H. Galderhead is representative of this close identification of
the

community at large with

the

Pullman strikers.

He was both the

President of the Butte chapter of the American Railway Union and the
Chairman of the Populist State Central C o m m i t t e e . A s such, Cculderhead
embodies the state's communal outlook, which provided the underlying
strength of Montana Populism and which manifested itself in the wide
spread popular support for the insurgent strikers in the summer of 1894.
This often intangible, yet widespread sense of identification with
the

community also explains

during the strike.

the

relative lack of violence in Montana

For, if one grants the strikers' commitment to and

identification with their respective communities, it follows that those
individuals also subscribed to the ethics of that social environment.
Part of that ethical structure actively condemned violence and property

20Ibid.. p. 170.
21Ibid., pp. 105-11; for more information regarding Montanans'
reaction to Coxeyism, see Clinch, "Coxey's Array in Montana," Montana;
The Magazine of Western History, pp. 2-11.
22ciinch, Urban Populism and Free Silver in Montana, p. 114,
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destruction by labor organizations.23

Operating within this ethical sys

tem and aware that widespread violence would cost the American Railway
Union its support within the state, the union appointed guards for rail
road property and counselled restraint among its members.

That the

strikers and the supporters obeyed so well was tribute to their convic
tions and an affirmation of their adherence to traditional, nineteenth
century norms.

23ihe state's newspapers illustrated this social more by their con
demnation of the violence in Chicago, Sacramento, etc., as well as their
previous denunciations of various incidents accompanying the Coxeyite
movement. Further, during the Pullman Strike in Montana, the papers,
including those which overtly supported the Strike, emphatically con
demned property destruction such as the bridge burnings and the
dynamiting of a passenger train outside Missoula, Montana.
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